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The purpose ofthis thesis is to detennine the most important tactors necessary for 
democratic transition in Haiti, and to assess tne U.S , role in promoting democracy 
This thesis provides an in-depth review of theoretical hterature on democratization . 
The thesis then reviews Haitian history, with a focus on the legacies that have 
significant implications for the democratization of Haiti This thesis concludes that the 
United States' support of democracy in Haiti is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
establishing democracy in that country. The United States cannot compensate for Haiti 's 
internal shortcomings, but it can seek to affect the t\\'o most important i11lemal factors for 
Haiti's democratization: civil-military rclations and political institutions_ U,S. support for 
democracy in Haiti will only succeed if the Haitian civilian government exercises control 
over the military, and if Haiti's political institutions are efficient and functioning properly 
Finally, the thesis (a) provides recommendations for U.S. policy vis-a-vis Haiti, (b) argues 
that the Haitian case can only be generalizcd in narrow instances, and (c) raises issues for 
furure research. 
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EXhClTJVE SUJ\.fi\H.RY 
There is substantial debate on the role and effectiveness of external actors versus internal 
acton; In the promotion ofdcmocracy. With the end oflhe cold war, the United Slates has become 
increasingly supportive of democratic movements and institutions throughout the world. ThiS thesis 
argues that without the support of the United States, hopes for democratization in Haiti would 
remain shattered. Because of Haiti 's lack of cxpericncc with dcmocracy, it needs such external 
support and aSSistance, which provides the opportunity for Haiti to begin the proccss of 
democratization 
Chapter II reviews the literature on democratization and the various factors that affect 
democratization, including: historical factors , political culture, political leadership, political 
institutions, state structure and strength, the mili tary, civil society and associational 1ite, incquality, 
class and other cleavages, socioeconomic development, economic policics and performance, and 
intemational factors_ Thi s thesis has narrowed the variables, and assesses Ihe impact of three key 
variables on Haiti 's democratic transition The first two are primari ly internal variables, while the 
thi rd is external: I) the nature ofcivil-ffillitary relations; 2) the strength of key political institutions, 
such as political parties, legislature. and judiciary; and 3) the role of external actors, specifically the 
United States. The thesis applies these three factors to Haiti in an etlart to assess this nation's 
prospects for a successful transition to democracy 
Chapter III reviews Haitian history, \'.1th a foclls on legacics such as colonialism; the 1915 
to 1934 U.S intervention and occupation; a politicized military; and the 1957 - 1986 Duvalier 
dictatorships_ It then provides an analysis of Haitian history by applying the truee variables, 
concluding that Haitian polity is chamcterizcd by revolutionary violence, isolation ism by American 
and European powers, and extreme poverty Moreover, there has been no tradition of a prop<:r 
balance in civil-military relations, nor is there a foundation upon which to build viable institutions 
After the first US occupation (1915-1934), not only was Haiti nowhere near a democracy, the 
country was left with a powerful and politicized military, the Garde d'Haiti 
Chapter IV examines democratization efforts in Haiti from the end of the Jean-Claude 
Duvalier dictatorship in 1986 to the 1994/ 1995 attempt to transition to democracy with the 
assistance of ex tema I actors like the United States and the United Nations. The 1990 presidential 
election was the first free and fair election since Haiti's 1804 independence from France. Jean-
8enrand Aristide was democratically elected December 16, 1990 by 67 percent of Haitian voters, 
and took ofllee February 7,1991. TIle validity of the election was upheld by the international 
community. It was hoped that the election would end the long periods of dictatorship and political 
instahility, marking the beginning o f democratic, economic, and social Prob'TCss. Ilowever,llopes 
for a democratic Haiti were shattered \\'ith the September 30, 1991 military coup d'el.at. After three 
years of diplomacy and sanctions, Haiti was offered a new beginning, wh ich came via U.S.-led 
intervention, albeit peaceful. Operation Uphold Democracy was launched September 19, 1994 with 
the arrival of20,000 US. troops, and the subsequent return of the exiled Aristide. Chapler IV then 
appl ies the three major variables affecting democratization, concluding that Haiti 's struggle for 
democracy isjust beginning with the assistance and opportunity that Operation Uphold Democracy 
provides 
Chapter V assesses U.S policy options and makes recommendations. The eventual 
cOT15olidation of democracy in Haiti (or lack thereof) could have implications for us. policy ifth" 
Uni ted States seeks democratization in other countries with limited democratic tradition, such as 
xii 
post-Castro Cuba; and if there is a recurrence of Haitian migration to the United States, or a 
recurrence of human rights abuses 
Chapter VI provides conclusions, considers whether the Haitian case ean be generalized, and 
raises issues fOT future research. There are three possible conclusions that can be reached in the 
thesis concerning the potential impact of the United States on the transition to democracy in Haiti: 
(a) the US. support is a necessary and sufficient condition for democratization in Haiti; (b) the U,S 
support is necessary but not sufficient; and (c) the US. suppon is not necessary or suffi cient This 
thesis supports the secund explanation. By and large, Haiti must democratize "from within. " With 
the 1994 U.S.-led intervention, can the United States compensate for Haiti's internal shortcomings? 
No, but the United States can seek to affect (1) civil-military relations, and (2) the viability of 
political institutions. For example, despi te allegations of irregularities, the ltltcmationally monitored 
e lections held in June and September 1995 constitute a positive step in Haiti's efforts to transition 
10 democracy. While U.S. assistance is vital, the United States cannot export democracy without 
Haiti' s readiness for the transition 
xiii 

I. INT RODUCTION 
In 1978, only h>,'O functioning democracies existed in South America. In 1995 , if Hait i 
makes the successful transi tion to democracy, thereby becoming a part of the "third wave" 
democratization phenomenon. only Cuba will remain a clear dictatorship in the Americas. By "third 
wave", Samuel P. Huntington refers to the, across the globe, transition of some thirty countries from 
nondemocratic to democrat ic poli tical systems between 1974 and 1990 
The tiny island nation of Haiti has received considerable international attention since 
September 30, 1991. when the Hait ian military violently overthrew Haiti 's first democraticaJly 
elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Elected December 16, 1990, Aristide won the fi rst free 
and fair presidential election since Haiti's independence in 1804. Despite the rebirth of hopes for 
democracy in Haiti raised by the election of Aristide, seven months after assuming the presidency, 
President Aristide was overthro"" and exiled to the United States 
Interrupted from 1991 to 1994 by the Haitian military, Haiti is once again attempting to 
make the transition to democracy. Backed by the United Stales, President Aristide returned 10 the 
Haitian presidency on October 15, 1994. That return el icited much euphoria from the Haitian 
masses. On October IS, 1995, Haiti celebrated the first anniversary of Aristide's return from his 
three-year exile. Amid presidential messages of non-vengeance and reconciliation, hopes for 
democracy are once again soaring, as they soared in 1990 and 1991. lnunediate questions are: I) 
Is democracy in Hai ti possible?; 2) If so, by what methods will democracy come about?; and 3) 
What are the critical factors for democracy? Moreover,just how important is the role of the United 
States? 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the most important factors necessary for 
democratic transition in Haiti, and to assess the U,S. role in promoting democracy. In Haiti's (;ase, 
the thesis will isolatc and assess three pivotal variables. The first two are primarily intcrnal 
variables: the nature of civil.military relations; and the strength of key political institutions, such as 
the political party system, the legislature, and thc judiciary. The third is an external variahle: the 
role of cxtcrnal actors, and more specifically, the United Statcs 
Democracy can be brought alXJUt through various In "Paths toward 
Rcdemocrati7...ation," Alfn:d Stepan IXlsits eight plausible paths, onc of which is externally 
monitored installation. He cites Japan and Gcrmany as the purest cases ofsu(;h foreign imposition: 
In his examination of third wave democrati7ation, Huntington also asserts that countries make the 
transition to democfllcy in different ways, one of which is a result of foreign invasion and 
imposition, According to HWltington, Wltil 1991, Panama and Grenada were the only cases of third 
wave democratization via foreign invasion, namely, U.S. intervention.! Huntington was ""Titing 
prior to the 1994 U.s. intervention in Haiti. Thus, Haiti would presumably constitute a third case 
of democrat i(; transition via fore ign intervention 
This thesis is important for various reasons. In temls of US. policy, the Haitian case is 
important for the United States because of (a) the continuing presence of 2,500 U.S. military 
iStepan, "Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative 
Considerations" in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence \.Vhitehead, cds., 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Unlverslty Press, 1991), p. 71 
'Huntington, Ihilli rd Wave' Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Nonnan, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 164 
personnel in Haiti: (b) Haiti's proximity to the Unitt:d States; and (c) recurrent U.S. involvement ill 
Haiti. FUrtJlcrmore, if the attempt by the United States to restore democracy fails, then the United 
State:; may be drawn into Haitian affairs again. especially if that failure leads to Haitian migration 
to the United States, Of a recurrence of human rights abuses. Also, tht: eventual consolidation of 
democracy in Haiti (or lack thereof) could have implications for U.s policy if the United States 
seeks democratiza tion in other countries with limited democratic tradition, such as Cuba. In terms 
of theory, external and internal factors havl: been posited as affecting a country's transition to 
democracy, with most of the litl:raturl: empha~ izing inkmal variables. Severthe less, the external 
vs. internal debate is an open one, and thl: Haitian case could lead to a reassessment of the relatiw 
importance of each. 
This thesis addresses a number of related issues, such as: What are the chances that the 
United States will succeed in laying the foundation for the institutions required fOf democratization? 
The question then becomes, can democracy be imposed through a·democratic means? What 
conditions need to ex.ist in order to establish a democracy in a non-democratic state? How docs one 
build conditions favorable to democratic transition? If the United States seeks to promote 
democracy, what is more effective unilatcralism or multilaterahsm? 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will pro ... ide an in-depth review of theoretical literature on democratization The 
thesis then reviews Haitian his tory, with a focus on the legacies that have significant implications 
fo r the democratization of Haiti. Follov.i ng the history chapter, the thesis applies the [hrel: pivotal 
variables to Haiti, to detennine the salience and effects of each on Haiti ' s democratization. The 
three variables were derived from the literature review. Various competing variables were narrowed 
to the three posited herein as most applicable to Haiti. The thesis will next analyze politics in Haiti 
from the end of the Duvalier dynasty in 1986 to the 1994 U.S .-led intervention, assessing the 
situation in Haiti (or a one year period, from September 1994 to September 1995 Infonnation 
derived from various interviews will add insight to the Haitian case 
The dependent variable of this thesis is democracy. The independent variables arc the three 
factors this thesis posits as having the most significant effect on the prospects for developing and 
maintaining a democratic government. This thesis will analyze the effect of thcse fat-"tors on 
democracy, in an effort to asscss Haiti ' s prospects [or a successful transition to democracy 
This thesis explorcs the aspects o[ one case (Haiti) against the background of broadly 
comparative democratization literature. The case is not necessarily unique, as evidenced by u.s 
intcrvention in Panama and Grenada. In 1983, under President Ronald Reagan, the United States 
invaded Grenada to protect 1,100 Americans, to oust pro. Cuban elements, and to promote 
democracy. U.S. troops did not leave beforc the pro-Castro government had been replaced In 
1989, President George Bush ordered the invasion of Panama in rcsponse to harassment of 
Americans thcre. In the end, a new democratic govermnent took. over, and dictator Manuel Noriega 
was takcn into U.S. custody 
The major argwnent of this thesis is that the Unitcd States' support of democracy is a 
necessat) but insufficient condition for establishing democracy in Haiti. The United States cannot 
compensate for Haiti 's internal shortcomings, but it can seek to affect the two mo~1 important 
internal fJ.t-"tors for Haiti's democrati7.ation: civil-military relations and political institutions. U.S 
support for democracy in Haiti will only succeed if the Haitian civilian government exercises control 
over the military, and if Haiti 's political institutions are (a) efficient and functioning properly, and 
(b) not inhibited by the ruling govenunent or the military 
1bc intcrnal fuctor:; are clearlv central, yet the US role is vitally important. The debate on 
the role and effectiveness of edema! versus internal actors, in the promotion of democracy, 
continues. Abraham Lowenthal writes that during thc Cold War, "the avera]! impact of US policy 
on Latin America's ability to achieve democratic politics was usually negligible, often 
counterproductive, and only occasionally positive'" With the end of the Cold War, thc United 
States has become increasingly supportive of democratic movcments and institutions throughout the 
world This thesis seeks to contribute to the assessment of the U.S. role in promoting democracy. 
Sustainable democracies share certain fundamental characteristics: respect for hwnan and 
civil rights, peaceful competition for political power, free and fair clcctions, respect for the rule of 
law, accountable govenunent, and an environment that encourages participation by all sectors of 
the population. In thcory, these ideals are great, but when faced with the reality ofa consistently 
non~democratic state, what accounts for this fonn of non-democratic government? Why are the 
ideals not realized? Many scholars have made significant progress in developing theoretical 
explanations for the evolution of democratic and non-democratic rule. The follo\\lng chapter 
reviews some of that litcramre 
lLowenthal, ed" Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America Themes 
and Issues (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 243 

II. REVIE\V m' THE UTI<: RA TllRE 
Existing scholarly literature defines dcmocracy in tcrms of three central characte rist ics 
politica l competition, civil and political liberties, and political participation_ According to Robert 
A Dahl, meaningful and extensivc competition among individuals and organized groups is the key 
cri tenon for a democracy· Juan J_ Linz writes that democracy is esscntially " the freedom to create 
political parties and to conduct free and honest elcctions at regular intervals wi thout excluding any 
effective political office from direct or indirect elcctoral accountability "j This procedur.t l 
definition of democracy provides a basis for an assessment of condit ions in Haiti and assessment 
ofa U_S_ policy toward Hai ti that is designed to foster democracy as it is generally identified 
A. GENERAL OVI<:RVn;W 
The issue of imposing, promoting, or exporting democmcy remains oontroversial Laurence 
Whitehead notes that an " imported" democracy may well be less solid, and less real, than one 
constructed from \\-ilhin 6 Thomas Carothers writes that external al1ors, even the powerful ones like 
the United States, a re limited in their abi li!)' to affect a country's JXlJit icai proclo:SS_ He gives more 
credit to the weight of history, culture and independent ac tions of indigenous forees_ Linz argues 
that the hope of making democracies more democrat ic by lUldemocratie means often contributes to 
4Dahl, Polyarchy: PanieJOation and Op.QQlliiQn (New Haven, CT: Yale Universi ty Press, 
197 1), p . I 
jLinz, The Breakdo\VIl of Demo CIa tic Regimes: Crisis Breakdown and Reeguilibration 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Universi ty Press, 1978), p_ 5 
6\Vhitehead, "Tntemational Aspects of Democratization," in O'Donnell , Schmitter, and 
\Vhitehead, eds _, J...Iilllli!iQns from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991 ), p_ 46 
regime crisis, paving the way to autocratic rule,' \\''hat, then, are Haiti's chances for democratIc 
rule? Will such assistance help or hinder Hai ti 's democratization dTons? 
According to Lowenthal, "there is broad bipartisan agreement. .. that fostering democracy 
in Latin America is a legitimate and significant goal of the U.S. policy and that the United States 
can be dTective in pursuing that aim'" However, hc argues that U.S. efforts at actively promoting 
democracy have been erratic, and that such efforts have often been inelTcctivl: and sometimes 
counterproductive. Lowenthal credits the United States with only a few instances of sustained 
promotion of democracy, noting that in such instances, U.S. influence was probably not the 
determining factor in consolidating democracy. · Tltis may very ' .... ell havc been the case, but today's 
U .S. policy and actions are seemingly different. There are successful cases like Panama and 
Grenada, where U.S. intervention helped foster democratization 
Despite such theory, which downplays external factors, this thesis argues that without thl: 
support oftbe United States, hopes for democratization in Haiti will remain shattered. External 
support is necessary because of Haiti 's lack of experience witb democracy. Haiti needs such 
external assistance and support for democracy ifi t is going to consolidate democracy 
B. FR-\i\1EWORK FOR IlEMOCRACY 
I1leorists have posited multiple factors that affect democmtization They include historical 
factors, political culture, political leadership, political institutions, state structure and strength, the 
military, civi l society and associationallife, inequality, class and other cleavages, socioeconomic 
7}bnl, p. 97 
sJ..Qwenthal, cd p. VII 
91bid, p. 261 
dtwelopment, economic policies and perfonnance, and intematjonal factors, 10 The analytical 
challenge is to discern which factors are the most crucial, then apply those factors on a country-
specific basis. For example, if one were to test the argument that high levels of economic 
development are a necessary condition for democralizallon, the cases of India and Senegal would 
seem 10 refute that argument f unhennore, "as Linz and Stepan have emphasized, the argument that 
economic crisis necessarily undennines democratic Teb.-jmes is bdied by the experience of the 1930s 
in Europe Democratic systems survived the Great Depression in all countries except Gennany and 
Austria . . " \1 
Regarding the rejection of other vanabks, like political culture, Larry Diamond and Lim 
note that ' 'the cultural thesis IS rejected on theoretical grounds both hy structural determinists, who 
regard the concept of pol itical culture as epiphenomenal and supcrtluous, and by those who find 
the sourees of political culmre more varied, its nature more plastic and malleable, and its effects less 
decisive than the thesis allo\','s,"" In addition, in testing the cases of Argentina and Mexico, recent 
empirical analyses do not find evidence of predominantly authoritarian political cultures in these 
two countries that have knov,.TI stable or recurrent authoritarian rule. IJ Tn tenns of the 
socioeconom ic development argument, Diamond, Lim, and Seymour M. Lipset found no striking 
leThe variables are taken from the introduction hy Diamond and Lira of Diamond, Lim, 
and Lipset, cds., Democracv in Developing Countries: Latin America VoL 4 (Boulder, CO 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. 2-47 
L1Huntinboton, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Centun" p. 259 
IlThe authors note that the structural dctcnnillists' position is not taken here by any of 
their contributors. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset eds., p. 10 
relationship between democratic development and per capita GNP (J9S5). In fact, "t\.\'o of the 
highest income countries in Latin America-Argentina and Mexico-have respectively been highly 
unstable and stahly authoritarian_ Costa Rica, whose per capita income is only slightly above the 
median for Latin i\merican countries, has been the most stable democracy_"I. 
Despite widely accepted and substantiated scholarly views, the Haitian case could lead to 
a reassessment of the relative importance of external and internal actors. History has seemingly 
demonstrated that the only effective means of ridding Haiti of its ruling military juntas was US_ -led 
intervention. Because of Haiti's history (the lack of experience with democracy), Haiti requires the 
support and assistance of such ex1ernal actors a~ the United States to make the transition to and then 
consolidate democracy_ In addition, the importance of civil-military relations cannot be ignored, 
and there must be a foundation upon which to build credible polit ical institutions. This leads to 
what is posited herein as the three pivotal variables most affecting democratization in Haiti . These 
factors \'.-ere chosen because of their prominent and recurring nature throughout the literature, and 
because they seemingly capture the dynam ics of the Haitian case. 
C THREE PIVOTAL VARIABLES 
This thesis argues that there are three factors that most influence democratization in Haiti 
the nature of civil-military rcJatioTL~; the strength of key political institutions like the political party 
system, the legislature, and the j udiciary~ and the role of the United States and its impact on 
democratization efforts 
I~ fbid. , p_ 44 
iO 
1. T be Nature of Civil-Mjlitary Relations 
Stepan and other theorists like Michel S_ Laguerre and Charles G, Gillespie espouse the 
importance of civil-military relations in new democratic governments_ They argue that if there is 
a baLanced relationshi p between civil society and the military, where civil society e.xereises 
legitimate control over the mi litary, then such a relationship is conducivc to democratic 
development,ll This has not been the casc in most of Latin American, but especially in Haiti 
The prospects for democmtization increases with the existence of a properly balanced civil-
military relationship, where the civilian government exercises control over the military. The need 
to establish an acceptable and sustainable civil-military equilibrium is of the utmost importance for 
consolidating democracy A politicized military has been a proverbial thorn in the side of most 
Latin American countries. Haiti is no exception, as proven by the mi li tary coup of 1991 . In a newly 
democmtic regime, democrntic noons of civil-mi litary relations must be explicitly expressed in new 
institut ional arrangcments. According to Stepan, civil and political society, along \V\th the state, 
must interact, increasing the effective control over the milital)_ 10 He argues that since a mono)Xlly 
ofthe use of force is required for a modem democracy, failure to develop capacities to control the 
military represents an abdication of democratic power As a result. civi lian government breaks 
dov.n and the milital)' assumes the governing role 
"Stepan, kthi~ng .\-filitarv Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, Xl 
Princeton University Press, 1988); Gillespie, '"Democratic Consolidation in South Am~rica," 
Third World Ouarterl..- Vol. I I (April 1989); Laguerre, The lvl1litary and Society in Haiti 
(Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1993) 
l' Stepan pp.144, 145 
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Laguerrc ' s equilibritun theory of civil-military relations posnllat(!s that the stability of a 
political system capahle of preventing military intervention is the result of three set~ of balanced 
relationships: those obtained bet\veen the military and civil society, between the military and 
civilian government, and between the civil society and the civilian government. An unresolved 
conflict in one or more of the relationships is potentially capahle of offsetting the balance of torces, 
leading to military intervcntion. Laguerre concludes that '"one cannot understand the behavior of 
tht: Haitian political system without paying attention to the military_ After all, it is an empirical fa("1 
that the majority of Haitian presidential regimes have been headed by generals"17 
What Gillespie identifies as pacts, are necessary in the restoration of civilian control He 
argues that stable political coalitions arc essential in democraeies_ "A reasonably 'articulated' 
political society is one in which the balanct: of power among social groups is roughly aligned with 
their relative strength in tht: institutions of the polity."l' In order for new civi l-military relations to 
work effectivdy, they must be embedded in a broader dcmocratic system, characterized by strong 
political institutions. 
2_ Strength of Politicallnstitutions 
Huntington makes the case for the importance of viable dt:mocratic institutions, asserting 
that "democracy has a useful meaning only when it is defined in institutional tcrms_,,'9 He argues 
that democmcy can be madt: only through the methods of democracy_ Negotiations, compromise, 
" Laguerre, p_ 2 
iSGillespie, pp. 110,1 11 
'9Huntington, 'The Modest Meaning OfDt:mocracy," in rastor, ed. , Democrac\' in thc 
Americas;~Wg tht: Pendulum (New York: Holmes & Meier Puhlishers Inc. , 1989), p 15 
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and agreements must take place in democratilation. Political institutions are important because 
\vithout such viable instimtions it is vi rtually impossible to consolidate democracy. As Diamond 
and Linz so ably point out, the strength of the political parties, the high degree of 
institutionalization, and the popular loyalty achieved by major parties were important elements in 
the institutional resistance of democracy in Latin America. A further weakness has been the lack 
of power and eff&:tiveness of legislatures and Judiciaries throughout Latin AnH:rica, and the almost 
nonexistence of legislatures andjudiciarics in Haiti. 
Democratization is problematic if there is lack of experience with democratic political 
institutions; nonexistent, ineffect ive, or non-democratic political parties; and politicized, corrupt 
j udiciaries. Democratic thoot)' stresses the importance of thc individual. However, in practice, 
democracy involves the credibility of key political institutions such as political partics, legislatures, 
andjudiciaries. The principles of democracy mu:;t be institutionalized. The political party system , 
the legislature, and the judiciary must be committe<! to the democratic process. Workable 
governmental institutions must be establishcd in which democratic theory is given meaning and 
made effective. Suffrage is no good unless exercised in free and significant eJections. Suffrage also 
loses much of its value unless voters can choose between viable political parties. Political parties 
perform certain functions for both the elected official and the citizen, serving as '"transmission belts" 
for societal demands. Political parties also serve as continuing bodies on whom the responsibility 
for achievements and failures may be placed, with rewards and/or punishments being dispensed at 
future elections 
The legislative and judicial institutions are spceifica!Jy mentioned because oftlle need to 
txdancc power in the policy-making process, and because of the tendency of law-breaking Strong, 
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effective mechanisms must exist to resolve conflicts_ A legislature should balance the executive 
branch. Moreover, fonnulation of policy by Congress should not be isolated from judicial 
interpretation. In order for legislative andJudicial institutions to operate dfectively, they must be 
free of political manipulation, corruption, and intimidation. The dynamics of the Haitian case arc 
particularly salient Haiti is beset on every side with innumerabk problems such as deforestation, 
lack of arable land, illiteracy, hunger, extreme poverty, low life-expectancy, violence, conuption, 
etc. Such problems require cffective government in~1itutions for their resolution 
Linz and Stepan are conect when they a~scrt that "there is no m:-ed for revolutions or coups 
when people believe in the institutions and in the fairness of the political process, particularly in 
elections as a method for changing govemments"l<J Likewise, according to Huntington, tbe degrec 
to which the democratic political system may be expected to remain in existence is dependent on 
the concept of institutionalization. HWltington defines institutionalization as "the process by which 
organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalization of any 
political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its 
organizations and procedures,,21 
Many newly democratic governments are struggling with what Diamond characterizes as 
" the rudiments of democratic institutions,' 22 The new civil-military relationship, and the key 
political institutions are in desperate neetl of educational, financial, technical, political, and even 
~inz and Stepan, "Democratic Consolidation or Destruction," in Pastor, ed., p. 56 
2'Huntington, Political O.r.9ll.iDJJl!mgi.ng _~~ (New Havcn, CT: Yale Univcr.;ity 
Press, 196R). p_ l2 
2'Diamond. "Promoting Democracy ,"~ #87 (Summer 1992), p. 26 
14 
moral support from overseas, mo~1 especially in the case of Haiti It is at this point that U. S. support 
for democracy in Haiti is crucial 
The global democratic revolutioo can Dot be sustaioetl without a global effort of assistance. 
-Larrv Diamond 
- 1992:!..1 
3, U.s. AssistaDCelSupport f ·or Dcmocracy 
Although the thi rd variable is generally posited as 'external actors ' in the theoretical 
literature, the focus here is on the United States because of its continuing major role in the 
international systcm, and because of its dominant role in Haiti. The argument made hcre is for the 
importance of the United States as an external actor, in tenns of its support for peace, security, 
prosperity, and democracy. As so ably pointi:d OUi by Diamond, "Now {1994] as in 1945, only one 
nation stands capable of leading and organizing the world toward thcse ends: the United States. ":/4 
In the absence of clear-cut, detailed steps to promote democracy, this thesis seeks to address 
the various challenges (political, economic, and military) facing the United States in the fostering 
of sustainablc democracy in Haiti . When it comes to the international role in democmtization and 
consolidation of democracy in HaitI, the United Slales' role is crucial 
This thesis argues that in Ihe case of Haiti , external assistance is necessary but not sufficient 
for democratization. However, this is not to say that the U. S. brand of democracy is for export 
There is a distinction between imposing democracy and promoting it Imposing democracy means 
attempting to install a particular democratIC fonn of government through a-dcmocratic means 
~Diamond, "The Global Imperative: Bui lding a Democratic World Order,"~! 
Historv,J anuary 1994, Vol. 93, p. l. 
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Promoting democracy entails peaceful support and assistance, which is only valuable ifand when 
a country is ready for democracy_ If the United States goes beyond mere rhetoric, and is committed 
to support democracy, then the likelihood of democratization increases. As Paul Sigmund argues, 
United States policy must be firm ly committed to supporting democracy as an end itself, not just 
a means to other ends.2j 
Whitehead distinguishes between three components of the promotion of democracy. " First, 
there is pressure on undemocratic governments to democratize themselves . Second, there is 
support for fledgling democracies Third, there is the maintenance of a firm stance against 
antidemocratic forces that threaten to overthrow established democracies ,,26 Robert Pastor 
posits an international democratic community as a vvay to prcvent the political pendulwn from 
swinging baek to dictatorship, noting that not nearly enough has becn done to assist in the 
consolidation of democracy against threats like militarism, debt, and terrorism. Pastor argues that 
a democratic comrmmity of me United States and other key countries in the hemisphere could take 
concerted action, directed at helping nominally democrat ic governments assert control over their 
mi li taries_ Such a community oouJd a lso monitor elections to solve the issue of tainted elections, 
as well as provide economic aid.:n 
llSiground, The United States and pemocracy in Chile (Baltimore, rvID: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 208 
260'Donnell , Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds. , p. 44 . 
27Pastor, " Securing A Democratic Hemisphere" Foreign Policy #73 Winter, 1988-89), pp_ 
55, 57-59 
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l:l his guidelines for U S. 'Promoting Democracy' POliCY, Lowcnthal not~s that, 
democracy is not an export wmmodity, it CaiUlot simply be shipped 
from one setting to another. By its very natme, democracy must be 
a(;hieved by each nation, large.!y on its O\\1'\. Tt is an internal 
rooted in a country's history, instiultions, and values 
good deal the United States can do, cspecIally in concert with like-minded 
COWltrics, to nurture and reinforce democracy in the Americas, [including: l 
First, the United States should consistently emphasize its concern with 
the protection of fundamental human rights 
Second, the Unitt:d States can cooperate with other nations to hdp strt:ngthen 
the goverrunental institutions and practices that make up the very fiber of 
democracy 
[,hird, U.S. offkiab (;an strt:ngthen Latin America's prospects for democracy 
by providing unambiguous and consistent signals that the maintcnance 
of democratic poht ies is a high priority goal of the United States. Through 
the advice of ib military missions and the content of its training programs 
for example, the United States can hdp keep Latin America ' s armed 
forces out of polities 
r he most decisive ways the United Slates can promote Latin Amencan democracy are indirect 
First , the United States can certainly improve Latin Amenca' s prospects for 
dcmocnH:y by helping countries ofthe region cope with their fundamental 
economic probkms [and] 
Fi nally, the [:nited States strengthens the ,kmocratic cause throughout the 
hemisphere and elsewhere whcn it is true to its political values and 
protects the vitality of its own democratic institlltions_"~ 
In theory, democracy as government by the people can survive and advalKe only when the 
mass public is committed to it. In reality, some countries tend to lack many factors that facilitate 
the process of democratization, whieh can be trdCed back to acoulltr;,.-'s history. In the ease ofIlaiti, 
lSIAl\venthal, "The l~nited States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from 
History ," in Lowenthal, cd. , Exportino DemOcracy The United States and Catm America 
T1lcmes and lssucs, pp. 262-264 
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the desire for change was heralded by the mass uprisings that began in 1985 in response to years of 
repressive rule by dictatorial regimes. The Haitian people were expressing their desires for a 
democratic form of govcmment after 200 years of military rule and non-democratic government 
While thc United States is not in a position to remakc instantaneously thc Haitian society, 
timely and 'veil-conceived U.S.-led assistance can contribute to the efforts of individuals in Haiti 
struggling to establish democracy. Is prcscnt-day U.S. support for democracy in Ilaiti an historical 
change? In the past, was there the emphasis on democratization that is so prevalent today? To what 
extent, if any, did the U.S. occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934 affect democratization in 
Haiti? The next chapter seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. role, along with Haiti ' s dominant military 
and inefficient political institutions, enabled the development of the authoritarian, dictatorial 
regimes so prevalent throughout Haiti's history. 
Many observers note that Haiti lacks a tradition of democracy, which limIts its attempts at 
democratization. Sincc Haiti's history docs not include a dcmocratic form of governmcnt, the 
question then becomes, has this country finally broken with the legacy of its past? In tenns of Haiti's 
political future, is the consolidation of democracy about to begin? 
The [ollov.ing chapter examines Haitian heritage, analyzing the kcy fdCtorS that contributed 
to non-dcmocratic rule. firs~ the chapter provides a synopsis ofthc nation's history, lx:ginning with 
French colonialism. Next, the synopsis provides an acC()unt of lcgaeies derived from U.S. 
intervention and occupation (1915 -1934), politicization of the armed forces, and Duvalier 
dictatorship. The chapter then analyzes these legacies, assessing the salience and effccts of the three 
pivotal variables, on Haiti's dcmocratization, as discussed in section C. This chapter argue~ that the 
three pivotal variables are the primary reason for Haiti's historical nondemocratic rule 
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m. REVIEW OF HAlTlAN mSTORY 
Haiti is a nation of approximately seven million people for which the average arulUal incam!;: 
per head is S320.29 The Republic of Hmti, sittmg on approximately 11 ,000 square miles, occupIes 
the western and mo::.i ruggedly mountainous third of Hispaniola island. HaIti's closest neighbor-the 
Spanish·speaking Dominican Republ ic----occupies the other t\vn thI rds nfthe island. The poorest 
country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti is about the size of the stale of Maryland, and is 50 mi les 
from the coast of Cuba at Ihe nearest point, 130 miles from lmnaica, 600 miles from Florida, and 
900 miles from Trinidad . .lO (forme location of Haiti, in regards 10 C ,S, proximity, see Map I. For 
an in-depth map of ~Iaiti , see Maps 2 and 3 in Annex E and F respe(;lively. ) 
Map L Lo(;ation of Haiti 
Northern Ha it i, ,vith its port at Cap-Hartien, has a tradition of independence going back to 
the Kinedom ofHenn Christophe (1 806-1820). Central Hai ti includes the plains of the Artibonite 
River and the commercial and government capital of Port-au-Prince. Southern Haiti, with its ports 
:Nus Department of State Background Not!;:s on Haiti, March 1995 
><Fs rian Weinstein and Aaron Segal, Haiti : The Failtl rc of Politics (New York: Pfaeger 
Publishers, 1992), p, 14 
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and markets at Jacme! and Les Cayes, has memories of bcing an indcpendent rcpublic under 
Presidcnt Alexandrc Petion (1806-1821). Culturally, Haiti is characterized hy a unique hlend of 
African, European, and Native American cuitures.J1 Haiti is French-speaking and Catholic with 
most orthe masses speaking Creole and practicing Voodoo 
What insight can an examination ofIIaiti's history provide? Haiti bears the most chaotic and 
disruptive history in the western hemisphere. This history has strongly shaped the nation's 
development or lack thereof. as well as its propensity for non-democratic rule, Haiti's is a grim 
political legacy_ Since the slave rehellion, the country has never had a stable democratic 
government, and has endured extreme violence and brutality . This implies that there is no useful 
civil or political heritage for democracy 
A. LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM 
Haiti won its independence from France in 1804 In the Americas, only the United States 
won its independence prior to Haiti, Haiti became the first and only black republic creatl::d as a 
result of a slave rebellion, which la<;ted from 1791 10 1804. Since independence, Haiti has 
witnesst:d a number of insurrections, revolutions, coups d'etat, and civil wars 
Independent Haiti ' s founding fathers , Toussaint L'Ouvenure, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, 
Alexandre Petion, and Henri Christophe dubbed themselves Emperors and Kings. These legendary 
leaders set the stage for Haiti 's future devciopml::nt. It was during th.e first two dl::cades of 
independence that the Haitian society began to take shape in a devastated, isolated country filled 
with illiterate fonner slaves, along with a few mulattoes, and devoid of any type of democratic 
institutions 
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Although Haiti was the second nation in the Americas to declare its inde~ndenee, the 
United States did not recognize Haiti' s independence unti l June 5, 1862 under President Abraham 
Lincoln, The United States was reluctant 10 recognize Haiti because slavery remained in force in the 
southern Unitl:!! States, The sudden independencc of an enormous group of ex-slaves seemingly 
posed a threat to pro-slavery proponents in the United States, The demonstration effect of a 
successful slave rebellion threatened the economic interests of slave-holders in the Uni ted States, 
who depended on the slavery-plantation system. According to Robert and Nancy Heinl, the South' s 
secession from the United States resulted in important diplomatic gai ns for Hai ti 
On J December 1861. Abraham Lincoln told COnb'Tess: ' If any good 
reason exists why we should persevere longer in withholding our 
recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Hayti and Liberia. 
I am unable to discern it. ' With Southern members absent, legislation 
providing tor U. S. missions in both countries handi ly passed and was 
signed by the Emancipator [Lincoln). . . on 5 June 1862. On 27 September, 
Benjamin F. Whidden, a New Hampshire abolitionist, arrived in Port-au-Prince 
and presented his credentials as the Unitl:!! States· first fuJi -scale envoy to Haiti II 
Thus, after 58 years, the United States finally recognized the Republic of Haiti 
I. Situational Oven-·iew: Colouial Society (1791 - 1843) 
The foll owing section examines Haitian colonial society broadly within the context of 
Stepan's defini tion of civi l society. He defines civil society as 
that arena where manifold social movemenlS (such as neighborhood 
associations, women's groups, re ligious groupings, and intellectual currents) 
and civic organizations from all classes (such as lawyers,joumalists, trade 
}2Heinl, Jr., and Heinl, Written in Blood: The StOry of the Haitian People 1991-1971 
(Boston: Houghton Mimin Co., 1987), p. 222 
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unions, and entrepreneurs) attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of 
arrangements so that they can express themselvcs and advance their interests. JJ 
In the 18th century Haiti was a rich, French colony where hundreds of thousands of Negro 
slaves worked on the sugar and coffee plantations owned by white settlers. The long period of 
mnnoil which began with a slave revolt in 179 t, and culminated with a declaration of indcpendcnce 
in 1804, set this country on a turbulent course of isolationism and internal strife 
Haitian society reflects, for the most part, the hi~1oric impact of French coloni7..ation and the 
importation of slaves from Africa. Therc are virtually no traces of Spanish culturc or of the 
culture of the Taino (Arawak) Indians who inhabited the island when it was discovered hy 
Christopher Columbus in 1492.-"1 
Colonialism \\~dS antidemocratic by its very nature French colonialism left a tradition of 
hostility to political authority, a tendency toward corruption and immorality in public and private 
life, an example of ostentatious wealth display, as well as a notorious lack of concern for sanitation 
and eleanliness in colonial urban centers. The French colonials were only interested in economic 
exploitation of its colonies. Post-independent Halti not only suffcred from its relative small size and 
lack of economic prosperity, but also from a lack of social, economic, political, and cultural contact 
with the rest of the world. Additionally, the fact that Haitian constitutions, until 1915, forbade 
foreign land ownership did nothing to further the end of Haitian isolationism. J5 
" Stepan, Rcthinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, pp. 3-4 
'"'Forced labor, abuse, diseases, growth of mesti:;o (mixed European and Indian) 
population, etc., contributed to the elimination of the Taino and their culture 
"Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: Thc Breached CitaJ:!£! (Boulder, co: Westview Press, 
1989), p. 48. 
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Haiti 's self-imposed limits were due in large measure to its militaristic govenunent- a 
government predominantly wJder military controL Moreover, such limits were compounded by the 
restrictions Imposed by intemational actors like the United States and France, After Hai ti ' s 
independence and subsequent occupation of the Domilllean Repuhlic, all organizational 
infrastructu re and institutions were wired out over the entire island ofHisparllola. 36 Haitian colonial 
society ..... 'aS plagued by the lack ofe'lperience of Hail ian ruJeI!i, isolationism, and economic poveny 
As the only significam authority, the newly indcpendcnt republic was built and controlled by the 
mi litary, who had as a primary goal; theIr 0\\>11 self interest Thus, in terms of a political 
background, all Haiti could claim was corrupt military dictatol!ihlp 
2. Political C limate: Pre-li.S. Intcn'cntiOIl (lS43 -1915) 
This section describes the Haitian political chmate broadly \V1thin the context of Stepan's 
definition of political society He defines pol itical society as "that arena in which the polity 
specifically arranges itself for polnical contestation to gain control over publie power and the statc 
apparatus")] In essence, a democmtizing society must include kcy political institutions like 
political parties, legislatures, Judiciary, elections, etc 
Governments were normally set up and changed hy military force with rulers too 
prcoccupied with mere survival to devote attention to constructlVt: activIties. Haiti's internal 
"'Hait i occupied the Dominican Repuhlic from 1822 to 1844. Diamond, Linz, and 
Lipset, cds., p. 428 
J'Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics' BrazIl and the Southern Cone, p. 4. He uses the 
word 'polity' to raise the classic Aristotelian concern of how people orgamze themselves 
collectively For Aristotle's argument, see The Poluic;, Book 1, Cbapl<:r 1, Sections 6-7, 14-15 
23 
politics lacked cohesiveness and direction. As widely noted, Haitian politics were dominated by a 
few elites, and a succession ofmiiitaIy strongmcn who controlled the presidency 
Haiti has had more than 20 constitutions, 16 of which were promulgated prior to U.S. 
intervention in 1915. The first was set up hy Toussaint L'Ouverture after the successful slave 
revolution . Tt was not, however, accepted by NaJX)leon Bonapartc. Christophe promulgated another 
oonstitution and crowned himself King Henri I of Haiti , ruling over the northern half of the country, 
while Petion ruled the southern pan of the republic as the first president-for-life]R Succeeding 
president'> revised constitutions to suit their own political aims. President lean-Pierre Boyer, who 
succeeded Pdion in the southern republic, reclaimed the northern kingdom after Christophe 
committed suicide. Haiti was no longer a divided nation 
Moral decadence in white colonial social and political life, plus 
frequent scandals in the Catholic church establishment and the 
colonial inclination to revolt against the authority of the mother 
country, established a heritage of political instability and corruption 
that survived the war for independence. N 
fhe framework of Haitian JX)litics was destined to be intrigue, conspiracy, treachery, 
violence, coups, regional wars, and overall instability. Tt was not until U.S. intervention and 
occupation that some semblance of order was restored to Haiti 
R. LEGACll:S OF U.S. INT£RVE!'TION & OCCUPATION (1915 -1934) 
The United States intervened in Haiti for economic and geopolitical reasons as well as for 
political instability in Haiti. The Americans wanted to control the finances so as to protect 
JSFmm 1807 to 1820 Haiti was divided iuto a nonhelll kingdom and a southern republii.: 
due to the nation 's split into two rival enclaves 
HHaggerty, ed., Domi~Lc_an Republic and Haiti: Country Studies (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 25 , 211-218 
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American interests there, remain dominant in the Caribbean area:o and prevent further erosion of 
the Haitian political system. 
A treaty set up in 19 15 and signed by a lIaitian governmcnt sct up Wlder the protection of 
American marines gave American officials control ofthe Haitian govcrnment's most important 
functions: the financial administration, the organi;r.a.tion and training of a new police force, and the 
execution of measures necessary for the sanitation and public improvement of the Republic." 
Under this arrangement, the United States and its appointed Haitian president, ruled Haiti togethcr 
There was little concern for democracy or Hait i's sovereignty 
One of the major legacies of the U.S. occupation was a rekindled Haitian nationalism, 
because the Americans preferred to rule the country through mulalto politicians. 42 This was resented 
by the Haitians, partiCularly the darker-skinned ' black' Haitians. Other U.S. legacies include a few 
new schools, a te lephone system, new bridges, and repaired roads.'> Additionally, U.S. marincs 
s uccessfully quelled the 1918-1 9 cacos rural rebellion, led by Charlemagne Penlite." 
Another important legacy was the professionalized Garde d 'Haiti which, though traincd by 
u.s. Marines to be disciplined, hierarchical, and above all , nonpolitical, soon came to sen'c as the 
key to political power and wealth. According to Robert HOlberg, 
4<y[his ,"vas particularly important due to the Panama Canal issue 
4ILaguerre., pp. 74-75 
4'Mulu/foes are the offspring o f white and black parents 
.j3The roads wcn: courtesy offorced-labor garu>.,.5 toiling uttder American Marines 
"Cacos were peasant guerrilla fighters (paramilitary) similar to Tanton Macoules 
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outgoing Americans hoped that the hastily promoted leaders of the 
Garde would, like the officers of the constabulary in the Dominican 
Republic. in Cuba, and in Nicaragua, check the excesses of the JXllitical 
cliques in ways which could not be expected from the jUdiciary or the 
legislature. It was soon realized, however, that this was an illusory 
hope, for the Amcrican occupation had failed completely to cure the 
fundamental structural malaise of Haitian political1ife. Nor had it 
managed to set the republic on a profoundly new economic road. 
Instead, the Americans had prepared Haiti for a continuation of 
authoritarianism and a renewal ofinstability.4l 
After the U.S. occupation, Haiti was back on its chaotic course of development According 
to Alain Rouquie, military forces like the Garde, gratuitously imposed on nations of limited 
sovercignty, gave rise to a certain militarism. 006 For instance, a major problem v.ith the legacy of the 
Garde was that it ended up filli ng two functions: both army and police. Laguerre notes that "this 
situation was the beginning of the role of the army as police. In 1990, the army was still the only 
police force in Haiti .... 7 This fact contributed to the military' s ability to ovenhrow the Haitian 
government in 1991 , and maintain control until the 1994 U.S.-led intervention 
C. LEGAClES OF POLITICI7ATION O F THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES (1934 -1957) 
The primary organizational experience of Haiti's early rulers was from war, so it was natural 
for them \0 use the military in whatevercapactty necessruy to govern the newly independent nation 
This set a panem for direct involvcment of the military in politics and internal security issucs that 
4lRotberg, Haiti: The Politics of Saualor (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), p. 146. 
4°Rouquie, The Military and the State in l.atin America (Los Angeles: University of 
Cal iforn ia Press. \987). p. 120 
" Laguerre, p. 79 
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continued for more than 150 years It can be assCl1ed that the Haitian17ation'~ ofthe Garde was the 
rebirth ofa politicized military Additionally, Lagucrre points out that the 'director' role played by 
the mili tary rul1her contributed to its politicization, "that is the fonnation of subgroups and thc 
politiciz.1tion or the administrative process in the army. ''''') 
Compounding the problem ofpolitic ization, the mllitary also served as the police force As 
such, the mili tary couJd engage in corruption at will, and enJoy additional legal incomc. Only with 
mi litary compliance could a constitutional mandate to separate the ann)' from the police be 
implemented, Laguerre reports that "the military imen'cntion of 1946 was thc first fonnal 
intervention of the anny as a bureaucracy . This inten'eution served as a model for later military 
interventions in Haiti and provided tIlt! military with thc opportwlity to change the course of Haitian 
politics"Y, The tradition of Haitian presidents' refusal to step down at the end of their tenn, along 
with rampant corruption, left the military with the task of restoring order. The Haitian military, 
having a monopoly of force, had li ttle choice hut to resume control of the nation's affairs. A 
politicized mili tary has been a proverbial thorn in the side of most Latin American cOWltries. 
Clearly, Haiti is no exception 
D. LEGACIES OF DICTATORSHIP: THE DUVALlliRS (1957 - 1986) 
Whcn the U.S, Marines landed ;n Port-au-Prince on July 28. [915, Francois DuvaJier was 
an eight-year old child; by the lime tttey left, he was a nationalist intellectual of27. Duvalier was 
"NcgotJ3tions/preparation fo r resumption of Haitian control of the Garde upon U,S 
withdrawal 
""laguerre. p. 98 
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a physician who had workcd widely in rural Haiti and was inspired by a rekindled nationalism 
After entl;':ring politics and witnl;':ssing the 1950 overthrow of Haitian President Dumarsais Estime, 
the deposl;':d minister of labor, Duvalier learned a valuable lesson that would have grave 
consl;':quencl;':s for thl;': Haitian military_ This lesson was twofold: he could not underestimate the 
power of the military; and in order to maintain sole dictatorial power. the military must be 
depo lit icized and stripped of its enormous power 
The Duvalier regime was a paternalistic family dictatorship that controlled HaIti from 1957 
to 1986, using a private army of enforcers known as the Tonion Macoules to repress dissent lind 
maintain order. Dr. Francois Duvalier was elected president on Septembcr 22,1957 and went on 
to establish a dictatorship ba.<;ed on terror, manipulation, and co-optation of the citil_enry_ He carried 
on the Haitian tradition of ruling as president-for-life. In 1971 , Jean-Claude assumed the presidency 
after his father's death, not so much because he wa.~ politically inclined, but because PaplI Doc 
decrel;':d it. Jean-Claude's excessive corruption and cronyism drainl;':d what little resources the 
country had left . 
1. Papa Doc (1957 1971) 
Because of the turbulent Haitian state of aJlairs/ ' from the very beginning Duvalier was 
obsessed with retaining power. Thc lesson Duvalier drew from the military's 1950 ovenhrow of 
President Estime was that the military could not be trusted. Thus, he acted upon this lesson when 
he gained power. As reported by Graham Norton, "Papa Doc smashed the power of the mulattoes 
51The country echoed with bombings, a series of plots, conspiracies and calls 10 rl;':volt 
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with cruel and systematic terror. A black nationalist who admired Hitler , he adopted the 
Hitlerian maxim of schrecklichkeit (frightfulness). ,,52 
High on Papa Doc's agenda was the dcpoliticllation oflhe anny and its transfonnation into 
an institution that would most benefit and contrihute to the grounding of his regi me, One of lhe 
most important legacies from Papa Doc was his goal to Duvalr~ri;e the military ( i.e., to make it his 
veryo\Vll, an extension of his right ann). This he did by neutralizing the military as an institution, 
making it incapable: of any independent action, As early as 1961 , Papa Doc decided to close the 
military academy so that mon: loyalist , non-commissioned officers would be promoted via their 
affi liation with his regime to ranks previously held by acadcmy graduates. 53 
Another very significant legacy left by Papa Doc was his creation ofthc single most defining 
institution of his regime-the Tonlon A1acoules. He creatcd this groupafier the Dade County Deputy 
Sheriffs ' Invasion, or !'affaire Pusquet. ~'which he successfully quelled. The Tonlon Macol/les who 
had overwhelming power, actoo as a mili tia, a mass political organization, a religiOUS sect, a secret 
police. and a terrorist unit. Laguerre writes that "'-the substantial number of Macol/les entering the 
army led to the deprofessionalization and continued politieization of lthe Haitian] military 
institution ,,5) By 1 % 3, the regime was spending morc than half it~ budget on the Presidential Guard 
and theA1acoutes. lbc rest of the money disappeared via corruption. Other legacies included tbe 
l~orton. "Haiti: Goodbye to 'Peuple Power' ," The World Tuday, VoL 44 (February 
1988), p. 21 
'JLaguerre, p. 111 
' ''An eight-man invasion lawlched from f 'lorida in the ninth month of Papa Doc's regime. 
" Laguerre, p. 119 
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elimination of freedom of the press and freedom to organizc political parties. In addition, Duvalier 
replaccd the bicameral legislature with a unicameral body He then decreed presidential and 
ieb>islativc elections. 
Papa Doc's cxtreme brutality, in wiping out all opposition, forced the majority of Haiti's 
professional people to flee. Haitian doctors, nurses, lawyers, economists, and other technicians fled 
the count')', totaling approximately 80 perccnt of Haiti's professionals by the mid-1960s ;'; After 
devastating hrutality at a Sunday Mass, the Vatican withdrew the papal nuncio. Under Papa Doc, 
Haiti became the horror of the hemisphere-a land where, in human tenns, conditions were 
according to Acrnard Diederich and Al Bwt, far worse than under the more widely publicized and 
condemned communist regime of Fidel Castro.)1 
In January 1971 Papa Doc announced his successor, his 19 year old son, Jean-Claude 
Duvalier. The constitution was changed to lower thc age of eligibility for the Presidency from 40 
to 18, and a referendum was held so that Haitians could officially affinn that Jean-Claude was their 
choice Francois Duvalier died April 21, 1971 and his son assumed the presidency 
2. BabyDoc(1971-1986) 
lean-Claude's first few years as Haiti's ninth president-for-Iife were mostly U11Cventful-an 
exten<;ion ofltis father's rule. Eventually, Baby Doc vastly expanded the scope of corruption. That 
corruption would lead to his downfall 
'613ellegarde-Smith, p. 97 
s7Diederich and Burt, Papa Doc: The Truth About Haiti Today (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1969), pp. 11 - 12 
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In tenns of civil-military n:lations, Baby Doc reopened the military acadcmy and created the 
Leopards Corps as a ..... -ay of oounterbala.ncing the Tonlon l'vlacoules. On one hand, his treatment of 
the TnnlonA1acoutes undid some of the negative legacy inherited from his father, but thc academy 
proved 10 be j ust another fonnal way of maintaining the system of dictatorial rule. 5S 
Baby Doc's marriage to Michelle Bennett, a mwatto, further alienated the Tonion Macoures 
and the DuvaJieri!>l: political establishment. Thus, Baby DO(; lost the finn support of the MacQutes 
and o thers who had hacked his father 
Haitians experienced. increased political repression under Baby Doc. The situation would 
eventua lly lead to widespread discontent Riots, beginning in October 1985 , overwhelmed the 
indecisive Duvalier and prompted military conspirators \0 demand his resignation, which \cd to his 
flight inlO exile in February 1986 The 29-year dynastic dictatorship had finally ended 
The Duvalier dictatorships left behind a country economically ravaged by greed and 
corruption, a country bereft of ftlllctiOnal political institutions and a legacy of non-peaceful rule. 
According to Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, the DuvaJier dictatorships from 1957 to 1986 were easily 
Hai ti' s most brutal experieoces in two centuries. Reportedly, between 20,000 and 50,000 Haitians 
were murdered during the Duvalier regimes, and about one-fifth ufthe population went abroad in 
political or economic ex.ile, the second highest ratio in the Western Hemisphere (Puerto Rico has 
the highest migration ratio). ~9 
With the exception of U.S. intervention and occupation (1915 -1934), Haiti has had an 
unbroken succession of dictators since the 1800s. Authoritarian dictators have governed this 
'~LaguefTe, p. I \3 
' '13cllegarde-Smith, p. 97 
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country for over a century and a half. What lasting cffeets has this type of his tOT)' had on Haiti? To 
answer this qucstiotl., having traced historieal1cgaeics of the Haitian polity, thc next section wili 
analyze thesc legacies in tenns of the thrcc major variables. The purpose of this analysis is to 
explain the tendency ofthe Haitian poli ty toward dictatorial, authoritarian rule 
E. A~ALYSIS: APPLYING THE THREE MAJOR VARHBLES (1791 -1986) 
Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal point out that "history is more ofa living presence in Haiti 
than in any other island of thc Caribbean.'o6O The following section which examines Haiti's 
historical legacy and its impact, focuses on the three pivotal variables that most affcct democracy 
in Haiti: civil-military relations, sTrcngth of key political institutions, and the U.S. role 
1. Civil-Militar:y Relations 
In examining Haiti's past, one finds a legacy of military rule and an inabili ty to properly 
balance civil-military relations. Not that this was ever a goal. The history of Haiti has with minor 
exceptions been that of a series of dictatorships in which the military designated a man to act as 
dictator, kept him in power, and dctcrmined his successor by either revolution or control of 
elections. Haggerty WTites that 
Consolidation of political power in the hands of strongmen has made 
the armed forces the institutional pillar of Haitian society. Born of 
revolutionary violence and plagued by socioeconomic deterioration, 
Haiti never succeeded in building civilian institutions capable of rivaling 
militaryrule. 61 
Haggerty adds that "as in other countries occupied by the United States in the early twentieth 
century, the local militaT)' was often the only cohesive and effective institution left in the wake of 
OOWeinstein and Segal, Haiti : Thc Failure of Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1992,) p. 15 
OIHaggerty, p. 353 
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withdrawaL,>lj2 This was the case in Haiti, and it served to n: inforce the military 's prop;::nsity 10 
intervene in polit ic s. TIIC Haitian military mentality wa:; shaped by decadcs of military control 
Over the years, the military has dcveloped so many prcrogatives that they find It diffi cult to cedc 
iXlwer The Haitian armed forces have been the single, most serious imJX--diment to the development 
o f democracy in Haiti 
In the history of Haitian civil-m ilitary relations , there were periods of political stability 
w here the military was less incli ned to intervene However, for the most part, there was no such 
thing as a properly balanccd relationship between the infrequent civil ian government and the 
mllitaT)'. According to Lagul:rre, "in the runeteenth century, the army served as the government, and 
this constituted a problem, or more precisely, an obstacle for the establishment of democracy in 
I-Iail i ' '/;] 
A good example of a Haitian administration's tenuous civilian control is the end of till: Jean-
Claude Duval ier government In 1985, thl: same time that the masses were rioting against the 
dictator, thl: mili tary also distanced itself from the regime. This instability eventually \cd to Jean-
Claude's 1986 removal from office and mle by a military-dominated National COllncil of 
Govenunent (CmL5eil Na/lOnal de Gouvernemenr - CNG) TIle primary goal of most Haitian leaders 
has been to retain power for as long a~ possible. This in itself is a significant legacy that hinders the 
viabili ty of a democratic polit ical system 
2. Strength of Political Institutions 
Fragile democratic institutions were immobilized by Haiti's historical experiences 
Instability is attributable lO the weakness of the nation's instltutlOns and to complete inexperience 
6JLaguerre, p. 63 
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with pluralistic democratic govemment.64 As acknowledged by constitutions, elections, etc. , the 
govcmment had some of the forms of democracy but never the substance. for instance, the 1987 
constitution was the most balanced in Haitian history, extending the powers of the legis lature to 
check the president. However, it W:L~ promptly set asidc by thc mil itary. The wheel of Haitian 
politics has been in almost continuous revolution since independcnce. By now the count')· had 
become accw.1omed to brutality, violence, corruption, and distorted polit ical institutions See Table 
I for a glimpsc of the Haitian political record for some ofit5 heads of state 
Table I Haitian Heads of State Political Reemd 
OF 35 HAITL\N 
HEAnS OF STATE 





17 SERVED MORE TIIAN FOUR YEARS 
6 FL"lISHED THEIR TERMS IN OFFICE 
7 DIED TN OFFICE 
SELECTED 
PRESIDENTS 
PAPA DOC & B.r\BY DOC 
CHRISTOPHE 
SALNAVE 
DESSALINES & GLillL AUME SAM 
Source. Anthony P. Mamgot, "HaitI. Problems of a TransltlOn to Democrac) 10 an Authontanan 
Soft State," Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs, Wintcr 1986-87, p. 82 
The simple fact that Haitian heads of state have drafted and abolished constitutions at will 
is a good example of the ineffectiveness of the democratic political system. The 1987 constitution 
that replaced the Duvalieri~t 1983 constitution, with a relatively free and fair popular referendum, 
""Haggerty, p. 199. 
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was never taken seriously by the regime True to iradition, the cunstitution was suspended by 
President Henri Nampy in 1988, and only partially n::instated by President Prosper Avril in 1989. f l 
The lack of a democratic tradition , most blatant during the Duvalicr era, impeded, if not 
made impossihlc, the nonnal fonnation of political parties hased on social interest groups. Political 
parties have existed in name for a lung lime, but they have not exerted any independent iniluence 
on the poli tical system. Rather, parties have served as campaign vehicles for individual politiCians 
See Table 2 for some of Haiti 's polit ical parties 
Table 2: Major Haitian Political Parties 
YEARS POLITICAL PARTIES 
1870s- \ 880 LIBERAL PARn'; l\;"ATIONAL I'ARTY 
19t5-1 934 ATRlOTlC UNION; NATIO;\lALIST IDlION 
1946 POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY; UNlfTEU DEMOCRATIC I'ARn' , WORKER PEASAl\, 
MOVEMEl'.'T; cm,lMVNlST PARTY OF HAlTI; HAITIAN ItEVOLUTIONARV FRONT 
1956-1 957 NATIONAL AGRICULnfRAL (NDUSTRIAL J'ARn', NATIONAL UNITY PARTY 
1987 ClIRlSTIA1'';OE',IOCRAT PARTYOFHAm , MOVE:\1ENT FOR THE (NSTALLATION 
Of DEMOCRACY IN HAfIl, NA nONAL COOPl'RA no'\' FRON"! 
Source: Haggerty, cd., "1}om inicau Republic aud Haiti: Country Studies," 1991 
Additionally, under the rule of Francois Duvalier, thl;.': court systl;.':m was practically non-
existent. For all inlents and purposes, Duvalicr suspended Haiti's Judicial system. This is nol noted 
as unusual because hi~torically the judiciary has been the weakest branch of the Haitian government 
Mlbid. , p. ]30 
The Haitian pTCsident had little control over the courts because the judges were in office for life 
This legacy stems from early Haitian constitutions. There were vain attempts at suspending the 
irremovability of judges provision in the constitution of 1918. This constitution was approved by 
referendwn in 1918. Howl:ver, legislative members had initially refused to approve the constitution 
purportedly authored by US Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D, Roosevelt-as a result, 
President Philippe Dartigucnavc dissolved thc legislaturl: in 1917.6/; 
Haitian internal politics ha.<; consistently lacked cohesiveness or direction. While the 
dl:illocmtic and egalitarian ideology of the French Revolution was officially adopted by the infant 
nation, the ideals wcre never translated into reality. Thus, Haiti 's democratic political system was 
inherently flawed and subsequently ineffective, due primarily to the Haitians' lack of experience 
with democratic institutions but also to the role of the United States. For example, Schmidt asserts 
that, 
instead of building from existing democratic institutions which, on paper, 
were quite impressive and had long incorporated the liberal democratic 
philosophy and governmental machinery associated with thl: !'Tench Rl:volution, 
the United Stales blatantly overrode them and illegally forced through its own 
authoritarian , antidemocratic system.~7 
Schmidt maintains that the United States was convinced that Haitians were incapable of self· 
government-so much so, that the U.S. occupation consistently suppressed local democratic 
institutions and denied elementary political liberties. However, with the Haitian political history 
of military dominance, chaos, and instability, just how viable were any such institutions and 
liberties? Even if the United States had activdy sought a democratic form of government during 
""Ibid., p. 224 
~7Schmidt, p. 10 
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the 1915 - 1934 occupation. Haiti did not have the proper balance between civil-military relations, 
nor efficient political institutIOns. TIlUS, US. assistance amI support for democracy would have 
been insumcient for post-U.S. occupation democratization. 
3. U.S. Assistance/Support for Democracy 
U.S. support for democracy, financial assistancc, and pressure can be 11 powerful stimulus 
and propell ing force. The question then is one of goals and actions. As pointed out by Paul W 
Drake, " In Haiti , the United Slates became an accomplice in the suspension of direct elections and 
of an elected congress for over a decade. The Wilson administration and its successors became 
will ing to sett le for nominal consti tulionalism'>os 
The isolation Haiti experienced, in its infant stale, was detrimental to the COlintry's 
development. The United States neither recognized Haiti's llldependence liar supported it, 
eventhough American intervention in 1800 had helped to establish the independence ofT ous~int 
L'OuverturcM Because Haitian independence challenged the foundation of the eXisting 
international system in which enonnous profits were made through colonization and slavery, Haiti 
was isolated for decades. The biggest tear was that the Haitian Revolution might have a 
destabil izing effect on the slave-holding southern United States and other European colonies. As 
pointed out by Bellegarde-Smith, "the fear that the Haitian Revolution would spread existed unti l 
the U S. Civi l War."70 Despite the assistance Haiti provided to Latin American independence 
;!Drake, "from Good Men to Good Ncighbors: 1912-1932," Lowenthal, ed .. ExnortinQ 
DcmocraC'." The United Statcs and Uttin America Themes and jssues, p. 18. 
69Schmidt, p. 27 
7D Bellegarde-Smith, p. 50 
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movements, it was excluded from the 'protection' alfon.k:d by the Monro<: Doctrine of 1823 
AdditIOnally, due to U.S. pressure, Haiti's invitation to attend the tiTst inter-A.mcTican condavc. the 
Panama Congress of 1826, was withdrawn. I3ellegardc-Smith provides an interesting account or 
Haitian aid to Latin American revolutionaries. For instance, 
In a formal 1838 treaty, tram;e recognized Haiti's independence Likcw1se, wording of a 
treaty in 1839 indicated diplomatic recognition from England. Neither of these trcatics had any 
dTect on the U.S dccision of non-recognition. Haiti's pleas to recognize its indepelKknce went 
unanswered until the 18(,2 emancipation of the slaves in the United States by US Presideni 
Lim;oln 
A maJor external shock to the Haitian system of dictatorial rule was the \915 to 1934 U.S 
occupation, but this cpisodc failed to lay the foundations for democracy. Instead, it created a new 
destmctive mechanism. namely the army, by which the authoritarian slak could be preserved 
As poinkd out by Diederich and 13tut, Haitians have long becn thinking about a democratic 
form of government. However, concerning rcports of post-Papa Doc contingency plans for the 
Unikd Staks and hemisphere troops to land in Haiti to peacefully export democracy, Diederich and 
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Bun were vehemently opposed to another U. S. intervention, favoring a Haitian resolution n They 
believed Haiti could and should democratize 'from within' and on its own, This thesis argues, 
however, that Haiti has demonstrated an historical inability to democratize soldy from ...,<ithin 
Whi le internal facto rs are crucial to the success of democracy in Haiti, the support and assistance 
provided by a dominant actor like the United States is also very important. As so persuasively 
argued by Diamond and Linz, the U.s. impact on democracy has varied depending on the 
administrat ion. Diamond and Linz writes that "when it has wanted \0, tht: United States has been 
able to assist the cause of democracy in the region, but only when there have been democratic forces 
and insti tutions able to make effective usc of that assistance·, 'J The I 9941l 995 US. support for 
democracy in Haiti could allow Haiti the time it needs to refine its instinrtions and build up stronger 
democrat ic forces 
fo'. SUMMARY 
According to Rotberg, "modem Haiti is a prisom:r of its past. ,,74 This chapter's attempt to 
examine Haiti's overall experience and assess the salience and cffcct~ of the major theoretical 
variables, contribute to Kotberg's assessment What in Haiti's history hindered democratic 
development? Why did U.S. intervention and occupation (1915 -1934) not put this eoWltIy on the 
path to democratization? Such que~tions are answered in this analysis o[Haiti 's political history 
H.istory goes a long way in explainiugthe unbalanced state of Haitian civil-military relations, 
and how Haiti's military developed into such a strong institution rhe historical past al~u explains 
7?Diederich and Burt, p. xii 
7JDiamond, Linz, and Li pset, eds., p. 50 
74Rotbcrg, p . 24 
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that it is not so much the lack of institutions, but rather the ineffectiveness of, and complete 
disregard for these institutions by Haitian presidents and the military that have undennined 
dcmocracy. Finally, U.S. assistance has nO! historically been aimed at developing a democratic 
state. One of the primary goals of the U.S. intervention and occupation of 19]5 10 1934 was to 
restore order to a Haitian society enmeshed in total political disarray. This disarray was such that 
US. intervention was necessary to protect external interests. In other words, and as suggested by 
Sigmund, US policy wa.~ not finnly focused on supporting democracy. At that time, democracy 
was not the end itself Instead, democracy was a means to an end That end being protection of 
U.S. geopolitical and economic interests 
Since Haiti's 1804 independence, and even after the 1862 U.S. recognition, there has heen 
very little evidence of U.S. support for democracy in Haiti. Instead, U.S.-Haitian relations were 
afiected by the perception of threat posed by the Haitian Revolution. Many within the United States 
feared the demonstration effect of the Black Republic of Haiti, and as a result the United States 
banned trade v.rith Haiti in ]806, renev.ing this emhargo in 1807 an 1809, The 'great fear' (the 
existence of a nation of anned ex-slaves) was such that despite the resumption of trade relations 
(e.g., from 1820· 1821 when Haitian-U.S. tmde amowlted to $4.5 million), Haiti could not gain 
fonnal diplomatic recognition from the United States until the United States addressed its own issue 
of slavery with the 1862 emancipation of U.S. slaves." 
Haiti \-vas isolated and virtually cut off from the international system because oflhe desire, 
harbored by external actors, to exploit colonization and slavery. This desire was especially salient 
in the case of the southern United States Despite these daunting circumstances, and Haiti ' s own 
7lBellegarde-Smith, pp. 49, 52 
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fi nancial probkms and frequent revolutions, Haiti, unlike most Latin American countries, paid all 
its foreign ohligations in an effort to forestall foreign intervention. It was not Imtil the loss of Hai ti' s 
coffee market with France at the onset of World War I, and the advent of foreign mterest in Haiti ' s 
economically weak government, that US intervention and occupation was deemed necessary 
Weak states on the perilous path to democracy will continue to require control of the 
military. strength of political institutions, and firm assistance and suppon for democratic 
development from external actors, U.S. support for democracy (1915 -1934) did not compensate 
for Haiti ' s internal shortcomings, in tenus of civil-military relations and political institutions 
Moreover, the nature ofUB. support affected Haiti-s prospects for democracy. In other words, the 
lack of U.S. sUpjX)rt for democracy contributed to the authoritarian foml of government that 
emerged afilo:r the U.S, deparhlre from Haiti in 1934 
Despite the elections of 1990, creating a democracy will be a novel experience for Haitians 
In the wake of dictatorship, Haitians must learn to live by ruks of fair play and consensus-making 
Military domination, manipulative techniques of control, and offieiallawlessness have been deeply 
embedded in the political society. The military so dominated political life that the foundations of 
democratic community-such as free cxpression, honest elections, a represcntative legislature, an 
impanial j udiciary, and a government administrative system at the service of the !kople-became 
subvened76 Haitian military rule left no room for the three central characteristics of democracy: 
political competition, civil and political Jibcnies, and political partiCipation 
;6Gabriel Marcella, "lhe Latin American Military: Low Intensity Conflict and 




IV. PROMOTL'IIG DEl\WCR >\.CY: THE VNJTED STATES AND FLUT! (1986- 1995) 
This chapter examines the situation in Haiti from 1986 to September 1995, assessing the 
salience and effect of the thrce independent variables: c!vil-military relal!ons, effcctive political 
institutions, and U.S. assistance/support for democracy_ The pages that follow analyzes the 
1994/1995 U.S.-led attempt to restore democracy to Haiti , as well as events leading up to thls 
intervention, beginning with the Haitian peoples' expression of their desire for change to a 
democratic form of government. Responding to years of repressive, dictatorial rule, the Haitian 
desire for change eruptcd in mass uprisings in 1985 
The argument here is that U.S. support for democracy in Haiti is a necessary hut insufficient 
condition for establishing democracy in Haiti . U.S. support will only succeed if Haiti gains and 
maintains effective civilian control over the Haitian armed forces, and ifcffective and Icgitimate 
political mstitutions arc functioning properly. The internal factors are clearly central , yet the U.S 
role is vitally imponant Haiti is finally frce of the dynastic Duvalier dictatorship characteri7--ed by 
29 years of merciless violence, corruption, abust:, and completc dominance Jean-Bertrand Ari stide 
wntes, 
Happily, in 1986, to the astonishment of the whole world, the Haitian 
people overthrew a dictatorial regime that llad lasted thirty years. That 
was the beginning of the end of a dictatorship whose marks are ineffaceab le 
The more those marks stare us in the face, the louder we Cty out: "Liberty or 
death, liberty or death l"" 
The end of Duvalierism in 1986 did not signal new beginnings for this small island 
natlOn-tht: plight of the Haitian people did not improve by much. However, since 1986, 
n Jean-Bertrand Aristidc, t.ri2!ide: an !\utobiogr1U!h): (New York: Orhis Books, 
1993),p.190 
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nongovernmental efforts incrcasoo. Fur instance, the organizing of activities in rural areas, inspired 
by [{oman Catholic priests and lay people, contributed to a significant cooperative movement 
Emerging political parties attempted to articulate interests and programs to attract support. The 
beginnings of a trade union movement to organize urban workers was underway. The Papaye 
Peasant Movement, a grass roots movement, promoting rural self-help and basic services among 
urban poor, was making valiant efforts at building institutions and promoting specific values. n 
These efforts, along with the mass demonstrations of February 1986 that ended with Jean-Claude 
Duvalier's flight into exile, and the new 1987 constitution sparked a hope for democratic change 
The hopes and dreams of a democratic governmcnt were quickly dashed in traditional 
Haitian style. In other words, the military resumed control of the government. They would rule for 
five years amidst chaos and confusion. During these years there were a series of eoups d'etat 
beginning February 7, 1986 and extending to September 30, 1991: the February 1986 National 
Council of Govemmcnt (C\G) led by General Henri Namphy; the abortive election of November 
29, 1987; the January 17, 198& election of Leslie Manigat; the overthrow of President Manigat by 
General Namphy on January 20, 1988; the removal of Namphy by General Prosper Avril on 
September 17, 1988; the departure of General Avril on March 10, 1990; and his replacement by 
Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal-Trouillot prior to the democratically-elected Aristidc on 
December 16, 1990, who was overthro .... n by the Haitian military September 30, 1991. 
Trouillot, the new interim, civilian president brought to power in March 1990 by civilians 
instead of the military, irupired a rebirth of hope for democracy in the Haitian people that eventually 
led to the first democratic election in December 1990 
J&Weinstein and Segal, pp.2-3 
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,\ HAITI'S S[[ATTERED HOPES FOR DEMOCRACY (1991) 
Haiti's cries for liberty began in 1791 v.ith the first slave revolution, through which hundreds 
of thousands of slaves freed themselves from the yokes of repression_ Haiti won its first 
independence from France In 1804. Then on February 7, 1991 Aristide together with the Haitian 
people, proclaimed Haiti 's second tndependence as he assumed the presidency, after that count ry's 
first free and fa ir democratic elections 
Many scholars (among them, Hlmtington, Diamond, and Linz) argue that leadership plays 
a significant role in the installation of democracy_ Huntington argues that political leaders cause 
democracy more so than factors or causes, as he labels them in his book, Thl: Third Wave 
According to Huntington, although pol itical leaders arc needed for liberalization, eenain 
preconditions must also be present He adds that " m the late 1980s, the obstacles 10 democracy in 
Haiti were such as to confound even th!:! most skilled and committed democratic leader." 79 Diamond 
and Linz also argue for the importance of political leadership. They associate the overall success 
or failure of democracy, over time, with the effectivcnl:ss of democratically-elected leaden; in state 
building and economic devdopmenL In Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, the 
skills, values, strategies, and choices of politieallcadcrs figure prominently in the explanation of 
the varied expenences with democracy in Latin AmcricaM Although not explored as a crucial 
variable in this thesis, the role of leadership, regarding democratic devdopment warrants a brief 
synopsis_ To this end, the two Haitian leaders. whose roles were si!,'llificant are presented In 
l'1-Iuntington, The Third WaY!:: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
pp. 107-108 
~cniamond , Linz, and Lipset, eds Democracy in Deve\opin(l Countries: Latin 
America, pp. 14-1 5 
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addition, U.S, decisions, in response to the Haitian situation, made by US Pres ident William 
Clinton are brietly exammed 
1. Jean-Bertrand Aristidc (February - September 1991; 19'-)4-1995) 
and reads eight." 
Aristide \\IilS born July IS , 1953 to a poor family in Port-Salu t, a coasta l 
village in southern Haiti, His fa ther died when he was very young, and hIS 
mother moved the family to Port-au-Prince. He has Just one sister, " nne-
Marie Arisllde l'ell the call to priesthood early and studied theology, 
psychology, and pllliosophy, tirst in lIaiti, then III the Dominican Republic, 
Is rael , Egypt, England, [taly, Canada, and Greece. I It: spcab six languages 
Aristide bcnclittcd from a popul:!r coalition of movements and part ies that had been 
actively organiLi ng since the aborted 1987 eJections. The most important component of this support 
was a movement known as the NationAl Front for Change and Democracy ( FNCO }-Konukum, The 
rural Papaye Peasant Movement also supported Aristide Membe rs or the movement went door to 
door on ekc tion day to get thc voters oul 
Amid fear rmd misery, the Hlllt ian people continued their fig ht against tyranny O n 
December 16, 1990, Haitians went to the poll s, hoping to triumph over Institutiona lized violence 
and to restore peace. They freciy electcd as their new presidcnt, kon-Bertnmd Arist idc, who 
promised sweeping ehangl:s Just who is thi s man who promised sueh changes never bcforl: 
y,itnesscd in HaIti? 
~'A ristide is fluent in French, Latin, Greek, English, Spanish, [Iallan, and Creole 
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First and foremost a priest, Aristide decided at the last moment to enter the presidential race 
The fiery Roman Catholic priest, knovoTI for his provocative sennoos, was expelled from his 
Salesian order for promoting class struggle among the Haitian masses. On December 5, 1990 there 
\\IllS an attempt to prevent Aristide from completing his e1eeloral campaign . 1\1 an election rally in 
Petionville, nt:ar Port-au-Prince, grenades were thro~n into a crowd of supporters. Although 
Aristide escaped serious injury, eight supporters were killed and 70 wounded_ Still , Aristide won 
the 1990 election by a landslide, with 66, 7 pcrClo:nt of the vote His closest opponent, Mare Dazin S1 
only polled 15 .4 percent of the vote. 
As for his affinity with and popularity among the masses, he was viewed as possihly tbe last 
hope of a people_ This stems from hi s upbringing_ In his autobiography, Aristide remembers 
summer visits to his grandfather' s fann: "I would have heen scolded if T had not greeted every 
peasant and every family with equal respeet ,,~j He claims to have learned a great lesson early in 
life to "remember al every moment Ihat no matter how poor, Io:vel)' person is a human being_ " &< His 
political rise as a priest was due in part to his ahility to mohilize the masses with riveting speeches 
that seemingly placed the ' good of the people' ahead of everything else. 
Aristide took the oath ofomce on Fehruary 7, 1991. Addressing the nation he proclaimed, 
"It took 200 years to arrive at our second independence_ _at our first independence we cried 
i2Reportedly, regarded by the United States government as the most suitable 
figure for the Haitian presidency 
!J Arislide, p, 28. 
'Liherty or Death'! We must now shout with all our strength, 'Democracy or Death, !"g; He 
immediately \-vent to work on keeping his promises ofrefonn_ The first task was to restructure the 
military, his greatest souree of opposition. Aristide called for the retirement of six of the top seven 
commanders, as well as the retirement ofthe most brutal rural police chiefs, 36 The remaining rural 
police chiefs were stripped of their \\-'Capons, and placed under the authority of the Justice Ministry 
The new president and his reforms oonfronted institutions that had always represented the power 
of wealth, privilege, and violence Aristide was quickly antagonizing his opposition For instance, 
he attacked drug trafficking, and favored raising the daily minimum wage which did not go over 
well \vith the military and its elite financial supporters 
Aristide speaks out on the many accusations leveled against him: 
I have certainly heen aceused of being a bad Catholic (priest) or a 
demagogic politician, one who praises commWlism_ T respond quite 
simply that Marxism is not a source of inspiration for me. Instead, the 
texts of Marx constitutes one tool among others to which 1 may have recourse. 
To flee from or ignore any philosophy is to prove oneself a cretin I have 
never measured people by their religious affiliation, but solely-ifT have the 
right to judge--by their behavior. By the same token, I do not consider voodoo 
to be an antagonist or an enemy ofthc Christian faith_ It is a religion or 
practice, _the two [voodoo and Christianity] are complementary in their 
opposition to evil. . .If [Sigmund] Freud could have sat dov-.'!! \vith a voodoo 
priest, 1 am sure that they wou ld have debated for hours on the complementarity 
or parallels in their two approaehes_!7 
Aristide likens the true hougan (voodoo priests) to the psychologist, citing cases where he 
helped many people v-.~th different problems through hypnosis. For instanceo on onc occasion a 
~~Howald W. Freneh, "Haiti Installs Democratic Chief, Its First,"New York 
Times, Fcbruary 8,1991, See A3 
2"1'he mral police chiefs were known as ('hefs de seCflon, and were notorious for 
their violence and corrupt ion 
87Aristide, pp, 69-70 
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child, mute for three or fo ur days, had her speech restored when Aris(ide hypnotized her and 
addressed the trauma that caused the muteness. n 
lust a few days prior to his overthrow and subsequent exile, Aristide announced to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations at New York, September 25 , 1991, these Icn 
commandments of democracy in Haiti ' 
The first commandment of dcmocracy: liberty or death - Haiti was one 
of the first beacons of Jibelty in the western hemisphere. the cries of 
"Liberty or death, liberty or death," far from being stifled by a sterile past, 
have rcsounded steadily in the hcart ofa people who have become, forever, 
a free nation .. .The second commandment of democracy: democracy or dcath 
• After having banished the opprcssive and corrupt regimc of the DuvaJicrs 
[Haitians] had only one choice: to install, once and for all, a democratic regime 
in Haiti . .The third commandment of democracy: fidelity to human rights-
If human beings have duties, they ccrtainly have rights: rights to respect and to 
be respected. It is, in the last analysis, to guarantee those rights that aJust 
government is established. .The fourth commandment of democracy: the 
right to eat and work - .. . The reality ofpeopJe who are starving because they 
are exploited is an immediate accusation against the oppressor a~ well as the 
authorities who are responsible for seeing that the inalienable and indefcasih le 
rights of life are respected. .The fifth commandment of democracy: the right 
to demand what rightfully belongs to us - The contribution of the Haitian people 
to Ole dcmocratic struggle that has been set in motion throughout thc last five years 
all over the world is remarkable and exceptional. .. No democratic nation can exist 
by itself, without weaving geopolitical, diplomatic, economic, and intcrnational 
connections . . . Thc sixth commandment of democracy: legitimatc defcnse of 
the diaspora, or tenth dcpartmcnta, - Driven out until 1991 by the blind brutality 
of the repressive machine or by the structures of exploitation erect(.--d in an anti-
democratic system ... [Haitiansl have not always had the good fortune to find a 
promised land .. . The seventh commandment of democracy: No to violence, 
yes to Lava/a?" A political revolution without anned force in 1991: is it possible~ 
Yes. Incredible, but true .. . The eighth commandment of democracy: fidelity to 
the human being, Ihc highest form of wealth - .. wealth should be at the service 
SS/bid, p. 70 
19Aristide refers to Haitians living outside their country 
'lO-yhe Creole term for nood Aristide's followers called his electoral movement 
Lava/as 
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of human beings, the pivot on which the whole politics of lava/as turns .. . The 
sufferinp: of one human being is the suffering of humanity. .The nmth commandmcnt 
of dem~racy: fidelity to our eultun: - Lava/as interlaces the cultural bonds at the 
very heart of the political universe. The tenth commandment of democracy 
everyone around the same table - Yes, evc1}vne around the same democratic table, 
1101 a minority on the taMe, not a majority under the fable, hul evc'.Y0ne aro.und Ihe 
same tahle . . Here at the end of the twentIeth century, the Repubhc of Haiti renOlmces 
absolutism, embraces participatory democracy, and intones the hymn of liberty, pride, 
and dignity .~ L For a brief summary of the ten commandments. see Annex C 
As demonstrated above, Aristide has certain strengths, but he also has certain weaknesses 
that may inhibit democratization in Haiti. Although Aristide's rhetoric is fully pro-democracy, his 
critics charge him with failure to renounce violence and to seck Haitian conciliation_ He seemingly 
had influence over the masses, yet during his seven month tenure in office (February 7,1991 -
September 30, 1991), he failed to invoke any significant curtailment of the violence, or seek 
reconciliation of the nation. Aristide's skeptics question the change evident in the president that 
returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994. Aristide went from a firebrand leftist, who denounced 'U.S 
imperialism' and condoned (or did nothing to stop) the use of the lebrun necklace (hurning 
opponents to death by setting fire to a tire around their necks) to the Haitian hero, credited with 
rest~ing democracy 10 Haiti (along with the United States). 
Not everyone in Haiti has faith in Aristide and his ability to set Haiti on the path to 
democracy. For instance, Charles David, forei!';ll minister for the Cedras regime, argues that 
Aristide "knows nothing about administration. He can exploit the problems of this country but he 
can't solvl: them,,92 Moreover, Grego!)' Brandt, a member of one of Haiti's wealthiest fami lies, 
1'Aristide, pp, 189 - 205 . 
92Linda Robinson and Richard Z. Chesnoff, "}.iow It's up to Aristide It Will Takl: 
More Than His Charisma to Rebuild a Shattered Haiti," ~~, Vol 
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claims that Aristide will inci te the poor to attack the rich Acco rding to Brandt, " lie ' s rAris tide ' sj 
not interested In umw Arist ide is no LNelson] Mandela 
2. Lieutenant General Raoul Ccd rH li ( 1991 • 1994) 
General Cedras, a 46 year old mulatto, is often credi ted wi th bei ng thl! 
arch\lcct of the 199 1 coup d'e tat The coup however, began with a mutiny 
of Sergeants and Corporals that spi raled quickly out of control Although 
Aristide proclaimed democracy as I la iti' s deStiny, the I [a il lan anny proved 
him \Hong, allcasl from the time of the military coup in September 199 I 
to the U.S. -led intervention 10 September 1994 The military leaders who 
oven hrew Aristide were sOlnt::what sensit ive to negative world opinion in 
that Ihey appointed a civilian puppet-president, Joseph Nerette . However, despllc th is appointment, 
General Cedras ru led Hniti's three-man military j unta irom the 1991 coup unll l October [994, when 
he was torced 10 step down, as a result of last-minute diplomacy and the multinat ional intervention 
Alter the coup, the th ra! men running the country werc Gcncml O:dra~ Armed Forces Head ~ 
Lieutenant Colonel Mlchcl Francois, Chief of Metropoli tan Zone; and Bngadier Gene ral Phi lippe 
Oiamby, Chief ofStalT They negotiated terms for the rClUm of the exiltXi Haitian president There 
were protracted negotiat ions, first by the Orga ni7.l1tion of American States (OAS), and then by the 
United Nations (UN), which took over jo int UN-OAS negot iatio ns to work out the condilions for 
Aristide's return In itia lly, the principal means utI lized ini ti all y to pressure the military were 
11 7, p. 52 
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economic sanctions, trade cut-off, and oil and arms embargo, nom:: of whieh were effective. These 
measures only served to worsen conditions for the Haitian people. The military was able to 
circumvent these measures, breaking two accord agreements_ One accord was signed in February 
1992 , and the other in July 1993 The military, headed by General Cedras, failed to honor either 
agreement 
The most imponant accord was the Governors Island Agreemcnt, signed July 3, 1993, 
wherein the military leaders in Haiti agreed to step down peacefully, allowi ng Aristide to resume 
the presidency. As a result ofthc failure to honor this agreement, the UN Security COWlcil approved 
Resolution 917 and 940. Resolution 917 established economic sanctions not to be liftcd completely 
until the tmee top Junta mcmbers Skpped down and the President and constitutional order weT(: 
restored. Resolution 940 authorized a multinational force to usc "al1 necessary means" 10 restore 
the President and a stable government, and to carry out the tenets of the Governors Island accord_ '14 
During Cedras' s military regime, there were various acts of violenee_ Well over 2,000 
people were murdered, and more than 20,000 went into exile, fleeing repression. Many thousands 
were also in hiding.9l In a televised address to the nation, President Will iam Clinton gave his 
rationale for invading Haiti_ He painted a gruesome picture oflhe inhumanity displayed by the 
military regime: "Cedras and his thugs have conducted a reign of terror, executing children , raping 
women, and killing prie~1S . As the dictators have grown more desperate, the atrocities have grown 
'!<"Diplomaey: Paving the Way," New York Times, September 16, 1994, Sec A5 
9, Aristide, p_ 164 
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ever more brutaL ''''''' After the September 1994 US-led intervention, Cedras went intu exile in 
Panama, prior to the return of President Aristidc. Tahle 3 helps to point out the extent of the cost 
Haiti suffered under the Cedras mili tary regime 
Table 3: Cost ofa Coup d'Etat 
COST OF A COUP: HAITI. SEPTEMBER 1991 TO NOVEMBER 1993 
Gross Domestic Product (GOP) 15% Decline 
Manufacturi ng Sector Lost 25,000 of its 80,000 lobs 
Expons to the United States 63'% Declinc 
Imports from the United States 62% Decline 
Source: "Anti-Arisride Camp Moves a 'Solution Cost ofa Coup," Latin American Weekly Rcpon, 
WR-93-43,4 November 1993, p_ 506 
Although the purpose of this paper is not to address the rationale for invading Haiti, brief 
comments concerning the skepticism and the suppon for such action arc ",arranted. At the time of 
President Clinton 's address to the nation, thc polls mdicatcd that two-thirds of the electorate, 
including both Democrats and Republicans opposed any military action. A Time/CNN poll taken 
after the President's speech showed that 58 percent oflhe Amencan population werc opposed and 
27 percent were in favor ofa U.S. invasion 
Blending elements of the Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine, 
Mr. Clinlon argued that if General Cedras refuses to yield power, the 
United States would have no choice but to invade to protect its interests, 
'to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to 
secure our borders, and to prescrvc stability and promote democmcy in our 
~uglas leht, "Clinton Addresses Nation on Threal to Invade Haiti; Tells 
Dictators to Get Out: 'Your Time is Up,'" New York Times, September 16, 1994, Sec. 
A4, Col. 1 
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hemisphere, and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and 
the commitments others make to us. ,~7 
President Clinton explained how General Cedras, during his three-year junta rule, reJccted 
every peaceful solution that the international community proposed, failing to honor any 
commitments madlo:. Two hundred years after the Haitian people rose up and declared their 
freedom, they have continually had their trccdom repressed. As pointed out by President Clinton, 
of the 35 countrilo:s in the Americas hemisphere, Haiti is thlo: only one where the people elected their 
own government and chose democr.u;y, only to have dictators takc that freedom away. According 
to the President, restoring democracy in Haiti would lead to more stability and prosperity in the 
region, as did U.S. actions in Panama and Grenada.~g 
President Clinton had some congressional support. For instance, Democratic Repn::'sentativlo: 
John Coyers, the senior member of the Congressional B lack Caucus, pointed out that "all other 
alternatives have failed, while the repression, torture, and anti-democratic activities have 
continued.""'" Democrat and member orthe Black Caucus, Representative Maxine Waters expressed 
complete support for thlo: President's attempt to "stop the killing, secure our 0\"11 borders, and restore 
democracy to our neighbor."IOO Finally, Representative Joseph Kennedy IT (Democrat) said that "we 
97R. W. Apple Jr. , "Clinton Addresses Nation on Threat to Invade Haiti ; Tells 
Dictators to Get Out: Preaching to Skeptics," New York Times, September 16, 1994, 
Sec. Al 
9SR. W. Apple Jr., "In the Words of the President: The Reasons Why We May 
Invade Haiti ," New York Times, September 16, 1994, Sec. A4 
'9J(atharine Q. Seelye, "'Few Opinions, Pro or Con, S(:em to Change in Congress,"' 
New York Tim§, September 16, 1994, Sec. A5 
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have important interests in ending the reign of terror that has killed, tortured, and maimed thousands 
of innoccnt people and sent tens of thousands of refugees to our shores.,, ~oL 
There were many, howl;:ver, who did not agree with the President The skeptics did not 
believe Ihat invading Haiti was actually in the United States' best imerest For instance, Senator 
Bob Dole (Republican) stated,"the President did not make a eonvin(;ing case that an invasion to 
re turn Ari stide to power is worth the risk of any American Iives" ,OI Senator John McCain 
(Republican) said, "It's a lesson of the Vietnam War we cannot forget, which is: we cannot involve 
ourselves militarily without the support of the American people " 103 Representative David Skaggs 
(Democrat) stated, "there's just a gut-level sense in this countT), that the interests of the United 
States in this matter are not serious enough to j ustify the use of our military "'~' 
In response to the lack of support for his decision to order an invasLon of Haiti, Presidl;:n\ 
Clinton declared, 
I know many people helievc that we shouldn't help the Haitian people 
recover their democracy and find their hard-won freedom, that the Haitians 
should accept the violence and repression as their fate. But remember, the 
same was said of a pt:vple who more than 200 years ago took up anns against 
a tyrant whose forces occupied their land. But they were a stubborn bunch, a 
people who fought for their freedums and appealed to all those who believed in 
democrncy to help their causc. And their cries were answered. And a new nation 
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was born, a nation that ever sincc has believed that the rights oflifc, libcrty and 
the pursuit of happiness should be denied to nonc_ [05 
Despite thc Wlpopularity of his choice, President Clinton made the decision 10 intervene in 
Haiti, which may have becn the sale remaining option that would influence the Haitian dictators 
Three years of diplomacy failed to oust the Haitian mil itary and restore Arist ide to the presidency. 
As President Clinton viewed the situation, an invasion was simply the right thing to do Haiti is 
elose to the U nited States, and the proposed mission ,vas clcarly achievable and limited Clinton 
compared the mission in Haiti to those in Panama and Grenada: limited and specific. There was a 
two-stage plan: first , to rcmove the dictators from power, rcstoring order and the legitimate, 
democratic government; second, after restoration of order and stability, the UN multinational force, 
including some U S. troops, would remain until Aristide' s succession (February 1996) after the next 
presidential elections scheduled for December ]995 
B. TRANSITlO!l; PHASE 
The argument here is that without the support of the United States, hopes for 
democratization in Haiti would remain shattered_ Moreovcr, lhe need for an external actor 
especially the United States, is suggested because of Haiti' s lack of experience with democracy 
The Haitian peoples' desire for democracy was demonstrated by their election of Aristide in J990 
However, despite the efforts of the Haitian people and their democratically elected president, the 
country was unable to cling to democracy_ This was due, in keeping with Haitian tradition, to the 
Haitian military's assumption ofthc right to govern the country 
1O'R._ W_ Apple Jr , "In the Words oCthe President: The Reasons Why We May 
Invade Haltl," New York TImes, September J6, 1994, Sec_ A4 
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rhe United States embarked on Operation Uphold Democracy on September 19, 1994, with 
promoting democracy as one of the main objectives of U_S_ foreign policy_ American troops entcred 
Haiti as part of a Multinational Forcc (11NF) authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 940. 
The MNl"s mandate is: to use all necessary meallS to secure the depanure 
of the COliP leaders; n:store the legitimate, democratically-elected Govl:rnment 
of Haiti to ~rwer ; and create a secure and stahle environment that wi ll allow 
the Haitian people to assume responsibility for rebuilding their country. In 
less than one month, the 1{NF succeeded in achieving its first two objectives, 
and in l anuary [19951, reported to the UN Security Council that a secure and 
stable environment had been established setting the stage for transition to the 
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMlH). 1()6 
I. U.S. Intervention (September 1994 - September 1995) 
Operation Uphold Democracy is not the first time the United States has intervl:ned in Haiti . 
In 1915, the United States Marines occupied Haiti OtIC to widespread civil unrest and instability and 
American business interests_ American troops stayed in Haiti from 1915 until 1934, leaving the 
Haitian mili tary as the most powerful institution in the eountry_ Haiti did not democratize after the 
Aml:riean troops left. Instead, the military Tl:sumed its traditional dictatorial role of governing the 
country. 
The weekend of September 18, 1994, a last-minute U.S diplomatic delegation, consisting 
offonner U.s_ PrcsidentJimmy Carter; Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat); 107 and fonner Chainnan of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, arrived in Haiti to negotiate a peaceful end to the situation 
in Haiti, and avoid a full-scale US invasion_ The delegation worked out an accord with Lieutenant 
J(16U S. President, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Haiti," February 1, 
1995, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, p_ 1 
,()"ISam Nunn was also the head oflhe Senate Amled Services Committee 
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General Cedras of the Haitian military, Emile Jonassaint, thl>: Haitian mihtary's illegitimate 
president, and General Biamhy. Under this agreement the dt facto military rulers, Cturas and 
Biamby agreeu to step down, voluntarily, with the passing of an amnesty law by the Haitian 
parliament. Although not an official part of the agreement. the generals ind icated they would leave 
Haiti by October 15, 1994. The third member oftht military junta, General Franwis, had already 
fled the country to neighboring Domi nica 
With the peace accord in place, the imminent U.S. invasion was turned into an international 
peacekeeping mission of 25 coalition nations. Their mission was to restore Haiti's democratic 
govtrnment under the terms of UN Se(;urity Resolution 940 , 103 
Operation Uphold Demoaacy rolled into full-s\";ng as American troops immobilized the 
Haitian Anny and cracked dov.n on Haiti's infamous paramiltiary groups. This operation primarily 
involved peacemaking and stabilization in Haiti. A contingent of marines, deployed on amphihious 
ships stationed ofT the Haitian coast, were the first to land in Haiti, Their primary goal was to 
restore order. The marines' immediate mission was to take control ufthe Haitian police, assuming 
the interim task of disamling paramilitary groups and the general public. The majority of the troops 
who arrived next were from the U,S. Army's 10th Mountain Division. They rl>:placed the first 
contingent of troops, the 1,900 or so U.S. Marines. The light infantrymen of the 10th Mountain 
Division quickly found themselves in the middle of Haitian street violence. A partiwlarly violent 
club-beating incident by the Haitian army' s Heavy Weapons Company,Jll9 where thcy beat at least 
108Dougiass Jehl, "Haitian Military Rulers Agree to Leave; Clinton Halts Assault, 
Recalls 61 Planes," New York Times, September 19, 1994, Sec. A4. 
'WThe Haitian Army's Heavy Weapons Co. were notorious for their violent acts, 
playing a key role in almost evcry recent military coup in Haiti, including Aristide's 
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two pro-Amencan demonstrators to death in sight of the 10th MOtmtain Division, sparked 
immediate reaction by Ikfense Secretary Wilham Perry. Perry quickly sent in 1,000 Mili tary 
Pollee, and changed the rules of engagement to allow American troops to use deadly force to keep 
the peace 
To a la rge deb".ee, if not completely, the Haitian AmlY's Heavy \Vcapons Company was 
disanned and dismant led by Ihe U.S. military, which was seen by many Haitians as the fi rst move 
toward Ihe eventual rcfonn oflhe entire Haitmn Armed Forces. The 10th Mountain Division was 
relieved, January 30, 1995 by the 25th Infantry Division_ In addition to the major U S. unit, the 251h 
infantry, there arc several other units participating in Operation Uphold Democracy Table 4 shows 
the participating units 
Table 4: Ooeration Uohold Democracv: Particioo.tin , Forces 
UNlTSPARTICIPATINGIN OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 
U.s. Units in the Multinational 
Force (MNF) 
Joint Task Force 190 
25th Infantry (Light) 
3rd Squadron, 2d 
Annorcd Calvary Regiment 
251h Military Pol ice Banalion 
65th Engineer Battalion 
47th Field Hospital 
3d Special Forces Group 
Non-US 











Nations contributing to International 









SI Kitts 51 Lucia 4th Psychological Operations Group 
Joint Logistics SupJX,n Command SI Vincent 
SourC!!. "Report 10 Congress on the SltuatlOn m Haltl,February 1, 1995:' U S Depanm~nt of State 
59 
2. Transfer of Power/Returo of Aristide (October IS, 1994) 
By October 15, 1994, the road was clear for President Aristide's return Within one week 
the military leaders were out of the picture On 4 Octoher, francais went into exile in the 
Dominican Republic . On (} October, Biamby resigned. On 10 October, Cedras announced hIs 
resignation and that he was leaving the country. Both Cedras and Biamby were exiled to Panama 
In the interim, General Jean-Claude Duperval took. over from General Cedras as eonunander of 
Haiti's army. Aristide had appointed Duperval, in December 1993, as part of the failed accord with 
General Cedras 
With the assistance of the United States, Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994 after 
three years in exile. He is faccd with the enonnous task of rebuilding his eUllltry, after another 
round of plundering by the military. Raymond Kelly, fonn er New York Police Commissioner, was 
put in charge of rebuilding the Haitian police force into a viable insti tut ion, capable of taking over 
from the US. troops 
Aristide's return received ajoyous welcome from his supporters However, the situation in 
Haiti was anything but peaceful. Aristide returned amidst vandalism, looting, violence, and revenge 
attempts. According to Linda Robinson and Richard Chesnoft~ it will take more than charisma to 
rebui ld Hait i. Aristidc must resolve "problems exaeerbatcd by the military government such as 
poverty, a wcak economy, and inefficicnt or corrupt officials (and institutions]") IQ 
in some of his first steps, Ari~1ide named a new prime minister, Smarck Michel, along with 
other cabinet members. The goal was to implement new plans and programs immediately, including 
IIOLinda Robinson and Richard Z. Chesnoff, "Now It's up to Aristide: It Will 
Take MOTe Than His Charisma to Rebuild a Shattered Haiti," U.S. News & World 
~, VoL ]17, p. 51 
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the creation of an efficient, decentralized govermncnt that works for and with al l c itizens; replacing 
the departed coup kader; and passing legislature to create an independent judiciary 
In Arisude's own words (French, Croole, and English), "Today [October 15, 1994] the light 
of democracy bums brightly in Haiti. It illwninates our nation's promise and potential to become 
a full partner in the wmmunity of nations. Many times during our three-year national nightmare, 
the light of democrncy flickered :md grev, dim But that light did not faiL" 111 Aristide threw a dove 
of peace into the air as he delivered his message of non-violence and non-vengefulness, call ing for 
Haitian reconciliation 
The most pressing concerns for the newly-returned president are countering polit ical 
instability, dealing with a militarized population, rebui lding an abused nation, and reconciling its 
society. Aristide has made great strides in his initial efforts, but when the operation was turned over 
to the UNMIH along with a departure ofa majority of the u. s. troops on March 31 , 1995, the 
immediate question was; ..... ill democratic transition continue, ultimately ending in a consolidated 
democracy in Haiti? 
3. U.S. PulioutIrransfet to U.N. Force (March 31,1995) 
Tn the United States' effort to provide support for the establishment of democra<.:), in Haiti, 
what is more effective: unilateral ism or multi lateralism? More specifically,j ust how lm~xmant is 
the role of the United States? 
In January 1995, the l:"N Security COUDCll declared a secure and stable environment in Haiti, 
starting the process of transition to the UNMll-I that would replace the US. operation. Although the 
lllJean_Bertrand Aristide. '"Haiti Emerges, Eyes Blinking. In the Sunlight of 
Democracy," New Y ark ~, October 16, 1994 
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United States did nut pullout completely, the Haitians were afraid of what the transfer to a UN force 
might mcan for democracy in thcir country. Most Haitian officials would have preferred that the 
United States maintain a dominant military presence until after the parliamentary elections held in 
June and Scptember 1995, and the presidential elections scheduled for December 1995. Haitians 
were worried that the UNMllI would not be equal to the challenge of providing a show offorec in 
support of democracy. Many Haitians exprcssed thcir fears, as reported by Larry Rohtcr, 
'We know that thc American soldiers arc men of war, marc ferocious 
than the men who will replace them: said Emmanuel Boisron, a peasant 
fanner who lives in the Artibonite Valley and credits the arrival of the 
Americans with driving the romons Macollte and other paramilitary groups 
underground . • A lot of the macolltes think that too, that they will be able to 
come back stronger when the Americans leave.' 111 
The UN force is restricted by narrower rules of engagement In other words, U. S. troops had 
more flexibility in determining the use of weapons, depending upon individual siruations. In 
contrast, the UN forces fall under stricter rules of engagement and are viewed by Haitians as 
weaker, in terms of ability to quell the violencelrevenge of paramilitary groups. The UNMll-i 
seemingly does not project the same level ofpo .... -er a~ the U.S. forces, the concern being, will the 
UNMJH be able to maintain a stable and secure environment in Haiti? How ,viII the U.S. troops 
respond to possible threats under their new rules of engagement, ~ mcmbers of the UN force? The 
UN force may not have the reputation of the U.S. troops, but they do have the membership of 
approximately 2,500 U.S. troops. Assisted by the UN forces, Aristide has been able to maintain 
peace while dishanding the anny and driving factions (still heavily armed) underground. The United 
112Larry Rohler, "Haiti Uneasy Over Pullout By the U.S:G.1.'s Yet to Finish Joh 
Many Say," New York Times, January 27, 1995, Sec. 11.5 
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States transfer of the Haiti operation to the UNMlH has seemingly been a success. The presence 
of the UNMIH troops played an important role in the peaceful elections held in June and September 
1995. Even if the peace is solcly wntributed to imposition hy UNMll-f troops, it is still significant 
that the troops were not called on to prevent any violence 
C. ANALYSIS: APPLYJNGTHE THREE MAJOR THEORl-:T1CAL VARL\BLES 
(1986 - SE.PTEMBER 1995) 
T he analysis will discern which, if any of the threes variables are the most salient, and 
v.tJether the means and methods of transition to democracy make a difference. Should one variable 
come before the others, or does order matter? The United States cannot compensate for Haiti ' s 
internal shortcomings, but the United States can provide a~s istance and sUp)Xlrt in establishing a 
foundation on which to build positive relations between the Haitian civilian govenunent and its 
military, as well as viahle )Xllitieal institutions. While U.S. assistance is vital, the United States 
cannot eX)Xlrt democracy without Haiti's readiness for the transition. By and large, a country must 
make the transition and consolidate democracy from within. There must be some form of 
preconditions, such as the 1990 elections in Haiti and an attempt at some form of democratic 
government 
I. Civil-Military Relations 
Scholars have posited many theories on the most effective method of achieving civilian 
control without weakening thc continuing basis of national security. Huntington argues that "'the 
one prime essentilll for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of military )Xlwer 
Objective civilian control achieves this reduction by professionalizing the mi litary, by rendering 
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them politically sterile and neutral."II) Stepan, Laguerre, and Gillespie argue that if there is a 
balanced relationship between civil society and the military, where civi l society exercises legitimate 
control over the military, then such a relationship is conducive to democratic development. 114 
Aristide immediately resumed the reforms he began in 1991, his primary goal being "to 
return the anny to its role as protector of the country and to suppress the last of the paramilitary 
groupsaJtied with the mafia. "I" Reforming the military was one of the most significant, ifnot the 
deciding factor in the coup that ousted Aristide. Aristide and his supporters were defenseless 
against the Haitian military and its supporters. Military members were interested in preserving their 
prerogatives, and \\1th a legitimate but powerless president, they could not be stopped. With the 
u.s. intervention providing the window of opportunity, Aristide turned his attention to the nature 
of civil-military relations. Because of the history of the Haitian mi litary, instead of attempting to 
enforce civilian control over the military, President Aristide has opted to disband the Haitian 
military 
The primary focus is on establishing a viable police force, distinct from the military To this 
end, retraining courses for fonner military members and civilian volunteers resumed on January 17, 
1995. The Interim Public Security Force is being trained and guided by International Police 
Monitors, and the Department of Justice's mternational Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
IIJHuntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theorv and Politics of Civil-
Mi litary Relations {Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 84. 
ll·Stepan, Rethinking Mil itary Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Gillespie, "Democratic Consolidation in South 
America," Third World Quarterly April 1989; Laguerre, The Military and Society in 
l:tli.!i.(Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1993) 
llSAristide, p. 136 
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Program (ICITAPt6 is assisting the Haitian Government in establishing and traming the new 
professional civilian police force . The new National Police Academy that opened on February 7, 
1995 will train the permanent professional police force 
One significant element to Aristide 's initial plans to achieve, then maintain civilian control 
over the military, was his attempt to extend peace and opponunity to former military members 
These former military members are undoubtedly afraid of retribution, but Aristide has allayed these 
fears to some degree by offering employment options to demobilized military members. The two 
options open to former military members were to panicipate in a free course of accelerated 
technical and professional training, orobtain ajob with one of the ministries, such as Al,>TIculture, 
Health or Public Works 
Aristide began by discharging milital)' officers of the old guard In an expedient move to 
regain control over the military, Aristide dismissed the interim commander, Duperva l on November 
17, 1994, Aristide then aplX'inted a new interim commander in chief of the Haitian Armed Forces' 
Brigadier General Bernadin Poisson. According to Poisson, " the signi ficance of this appointment 
is that the government wants to change the image of the anny"l17 As Army Commander, Poisson 
announced the appointment of a new anny High Command on November 19, 1994 .'18 
116IC[TAP has the benefit of recenl experience in this field . Allerthe 1989 U.S 
invasion, il helped set up Panama's new Fuerza Pubhca. mainly \vith former members of 
General Noriega's defense forces. "Difficult Transition Gets Under Way," Latin 
American Weekly, WR-94-40, 20 October 1994, p. 470. 
117"Aristide Removes Army Commander," Latin American Weekly Repon, WR-
94-46, 1 December 1994, p. 544 
III"Army Commander Appoints New High Command," Paris AFP in Spanish 
1633 GMT November 19 1994, Translated by ffil$ 
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Parts of the Haitian (;onstitution that have never been adhered 10 are being dealt \vith, such 
as exerting civilian control ovtr the military This has never been effectively accomplished to the 
benefit oftht Haitian people. Francois Duvalitr did gain control of the mili tary hut only to the 
extent that it served his dictatorial purposes Aristide's decision to disband the Haitian military is 
a popular one among Haitians. 
On Ftbruary 21,1995, Aristide originally atttmpted to gain control of the military Ht 
purged the Haitian milital)', dismissing most of the senior ofllcer corps, including the interim 
military commander-in-chief Poisson The Minister of Deftnse, General Wilthian Lherisson, 
authorized financial wmpensation, to be paid to the forced retirees upon suITt:nder of all weapons 
in thei r possession or under their command. Aristidt reduced the military from more than 7,000 
soldiers to about 1,500. I I~ He now has a new, well-trained police force , under the guidance of Ray 
Kelly (fanner New York City Police Chief). This new police force is separate from the military, 
with members recruited from fonner'{XIlitieal refug(."'t:s and other enemies of the fanner dictatorship 
As noted by Stepan, "a basic aspect of civil-military relations is the potential tension that 
exists between the civilian political rulers ' need 10 maintain an armed force as an instrument of 
fore ign poliey and internal order, and their need to ensure that military power docs not usurp 
'{XIlitieal power.,,120 If President Aristide has his way, Haiti "ill not haVt to deal with a politicized 
militaty He has stated that his number one priority is ensuring that "the army doesn't exist 
ll Jl.a rry Rohtcr, "Anny Leaders Forced Out By Aristidc:' New York Times, 
February 22, 1995, Sec. A5 
120Stepan, ~in Politics: Changin2 Patterns in 8razil (Princeton, NJ 
Princeton University Press, 1971). p. 57. 
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anymore. 11 which, considtring Haiti's history ofpoliticiled armed forces, might be the solmion 
for Hait i Aristide's abolition of the 7,OOO-man army in favor of a newly trained 5,000 member 
national police fOKe is the most important step In Haiti's democratic tramition_There has been no 
modem tradition ofa balance between civil-military relations, nor is tllere a foundation uptln which 
to huild vi~ble institutions such a.o; a politiml party system, a legisJature, or ~,Iudi(;i~ry 
2. StrenKth of PolitieallnstitutiollS 
Aristide also turned his attention to key political institutions, Traditionally, Haitia.n political 
institutions havt had little, if any semblance of democratic goveming, There was evidem;e in 1987 
of the Haitian desire for effective and legitimat~ imtitutions. ror example, along \\-ith the nnv 
1987 (;onstitution, a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) was created_ The CEP was made up of 
representatives of democratic organiz~tions. However, it was curtailed by the ~ational Council of 
Government (CNG), which was headed by the military_ ,"" Judicial processes and a properly 
functioning pol i.:e force are essential 10 deter violence and expedite Justice 
The inability of the majority of the population (85%.) to read or write can be ~ drawba(;k to 
el(:ctoral pmticipation and the development of political parties. [n 1990, ,,;,,ristide and his supponers 
nevertheless mobilized the masses \0 vote_ In order to facilitate voting for illiterates, there wcre 
symbols on the ballots, representing the candidates_ The presence of educated masses does not 
necessarily lead to democratic development Cuba is a good example: although under Fidel Castro 
t:IPresiden\ A.ristide's Internet Interview, American On-I .lne, Julv 'i, 1995 
mKi(;hard A. Haggerty, ed., Il_Qnlillican ,Rep\lblicand I Taiti _Country Stu~ 
(Headquarter~, Department of the Anny: U.S Govenunent Printing Oflice, 1991), p. 328 
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Cuba has a high literacy rate of98.5% (according to U.S. Department of State' s 1990 Background 
Notes), litera(;y has not made Cuba a dcmocra(;y 
As noted by Aristidc, "politics cannot be conducted without mutual respect between the 
legislature and the executive." ,23 On November 4, 1994, Aristide met with more than 60 senators 
and deputies from different political affiliations to discuss the national reconciliation process. He 
noted the Parliament's importance to a democratic system and addn:ssed upcoming legislative 
elections. Aristide seems totally conunitled to building viable institutions. Thus far he has received 
support from many forme r opponents For example, "Rita Frederic Moncocur, of the Union for 
National Reconciliation, who opposed President Aristide's return to Haiti, hailed President 
Aristidc's initiative[sj." "" Reform programs include initiatives to decentralize the administration 
of j lL~tice and government, placing a nwnber of services under departmental and municipal control, 
privatization of state-owned companies, and a comprehensive review of penal, civil, and 
commercial legislation. 
According to Amy Wikntz, "Nowhere in Haiti is the lack of democratic institutions more 
obvious or more important than in the Judicial systcm. "m She points out that without the ability 
to seek institutional justice, Haitians arc likely to continue to take matters of Justice into their 0\..." 
hands. Anned with international backing and support, Aristide has the opponunity to ereate for the 
first time in Haitian history a government that works, one that includes a properly functioning Justice 
mAristide, p. 162 
,l'''Aristide Meets Leb>islators on Elections 4 Nov," Port-Au-Prince Radio 
M~le in French 1700 GMT November 4 1 99::L Translated hyFBIS, 7 Nov 94, p. 15. 
mAmy Wi lentz, "After the Jubilation, Aristide Faces Hard Job ofGovcrning," 
LQsAnQeJes~. October 16, 1994, p. 232 
system and a viable police forcc. There is some evidence of progress toward stronger pol itical 
institutions . As reported in President Clinton' s report to Congrcss, "a project to resurrect Haiti 's 
moribund Judicial system, involving in its tirst stage the training of justices of the peace, was 
launched by the US. Administration of Ju..-tice programs on January 17, [1 995] in cooperation with 
the Hai tian Justice Ministry.·,m In one landmark case, one of severa! alleged authors of the 
assassination of industrialist Antoine Izmery, a democratic activist who was murdered in front of 
the Sacred Heart Church on Septcmber i i , 1993, the attache Gerard Gustavc, alias Zimbabwe, was 
recently tried and convicted on charges of premeditated murder, conspiracy, and assassination On 
August 25 , 1995, he was sentenced to life in prison. Furthermore, Emmanuel Constant, leader of 
the paramilitary organization accused of perpetrating thousands of crimes during the military 
regime, appeared in fedcral court m chams on August 25, 1995 in Baltimore, tvlaryland. Constant 
WdS being tried for deportation, as the U.S. State Department had revoked his visa. A warrant for 
Constant's arrest is pending in Haiti, whcre he faces charges of assassination, rape, kidnaping and 
tonure. The Haitian government has fi led for Constant's extradition to I lai ti . Constant' s return to 
Haiti is widely viewed by the Haitian people as a fundamenta l step towards aceoumabi lity and 
Justice. 
In order to complete the transition to demoeracy it is essential that Aristide nd Haiti of the 
ant i-dcmocratic elements that tor so long have bccn cntrenched in the country's political system 
Since President Aristide's return, not only has he been able to begin the difficult task of 
depoliticizing and refonning Haiti's armed forces but thc Haitian Parliamcnt is in session as well , 
126U. S. President, '"Report to Congress on the Situation in Haiti," Fcbruary 1 
1995, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, p. 5 
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and prospects for the upcoming presidential election are promising. The Haitian Parliament has 
again committed itself to ensilling a free and fair presidential election. HO\vever, as pointed out by 
Alain Rouquic, "while it is easy to call elections, it is more difficult to govern after many years of 
destructive military lUk In fae~ a draft electoral law, approved by the Haitian Parliament, 
makes provisions for establishing departmental and communal electoral councils, delineation of 
electoral districts , the eligibility and registration of candidates, the establishment of registration 
offices and polling places, and voter eligibility and registration. ! '~ 
Dcspite the reservations, observed in many Hait ians, parliamentary elections, originally 
scheduled for May, were successfully held on June 25, 1995. Obscrvers reported confusion and 
foul-ups at the polls, but little violence. As reported in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, tens of 
thousands of Haitians voted in a confused but relatively peaceful first election since 20,000 U.S 
military personnel restored President Aristide to power on October 15 , 1994, 129 Makeup 
parli amentary elections were postponed until August 13 and 21,1995 because of protests, hy 
political partics, of administrativc problems in the first round of voting, Aristide has comc under 
attack for the parliamentary elections held in June \vith lUnoffs in September 1995, The Lavalas 
Party won thc June votc by a landslide, taking 67 oflhe 83 scats in the lowcr housc. Opposition 
parties criticized the election, claiming v.idcsprcad irrcgularities. For instance, some polls opencd 
1J7.AJain Rouquic, The Militarv and the State in Latin America (ws Angeles, 
Universi ty of Cali fomi a Press, 1977). p. 394 
L28U. S. President, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Haiti," Fehruary 1, 
1995, The Vo,fh.ite House, Office of the Press Secretary, p. 6. 
1 2~" l-laitians Vote Amid Peaceful Confusion,' St Louis Post-DisP<1lch, June 26, 
1995. P 1 
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late or not at all, candidates name were left off some ballots, and voter's names were missing from 
registration lists 1)0 Nevertheless, international observers' consensus supported the validity of the 
elections 
When Haiti attempted to hold elections in 1987, amly-backed death squads attacked voters 
with guns and machetes. As for the 1990 presidentml election, the Haitian army's September 199\ 
coup d'etat deposed tht: !:leeted president. Aristide 's optimism runs high_ He noted that, "we didn't 
have any tradition of organizing elections_ If we can organize in three months three elections, that 
means a lot for my COWltf)'_ _this is paving the way to h-ep moving ahead toward dcmocraey_ "LJ ' 
Moreover, Aristide rejects suggestions that Haiti is headed toward one-pany rule He stated, 
"because we mean what we say in terms of building a state of law, we m:ed a minority as we need 
a majority, we need the leaders oCthe opposition as we need those who support our government, we 
need the rich as we need the jX)OL"m According to analysts, the opposition must regroup after the 
overwhelming majority won by the Aristide supported Lavalas party, and pnor to the presidential 
election, scheduled lor December 1995, ifil is to regain credibility as a viable political force 
3. U.S. Assistance/Support for Democracy 
f ew people dispute the value of democracies According to democratic peace theory, 
democracies make good trading partners, they generally do not go to war with each other, and they 
lJO" Anstide Backers Dominate Eleetion Round," New York Times, August 22, 
1995 , Sec. A3 
I3:Sandra Marquez. 'Democracy Emerging in Haiti, Aristide Says,"~, 
'Jeptember 18, 1995. AOL 
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tend to avoid hwnan rights abuses. Moreover, without the violence and repression , citizens tend to 
mih'Tatc less. It is thus no surprise that promoting democracy remains at the heart of U.S foreign 
policy. As history has seemingly demonstrated, the spread of democracy leads to greater world 
peace and eooperation. l3J 
U.S presence has had a great impaet on democratization in sueh cases a~ Haiti, Panama, and 
Grenada. For the United States, it may be preferable to promote democracy via multilateralism 
The assistance of the United Nations and other countries relieves the United States of bearing the 
heavy burden uni laterally. The United States, still the most powerful nation, and champion of the 
principles of democracy, has the responsihility as the world's leader to support and encourage 
worldwide support for fledgling democracies. The U.S. influence can be so great (especially 
economic influence) that the United States is bOW1d to positively influence democratic development 
in nations such as Haiti, Panama, and Grenada 
In tenns ofanalyring the U S. role, Jorge Castaneda asserts that the key element to consider 
was the alternative: "Without such intervention, the disintegration of Haitian society seemed 
unavoidable."'''' Castaneda argues that forced removal of lhe dictatorship was the only way to end 
the violence against the Haitian people 
WDcmocratie Peace Theory literature ineludes: JohnM Owen, "How Liberalism 
Produces Democratic Peace" in International Securitv, Vol. 19, No.2 (Fall 1992), p_ 87 ~ 
David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War" in Amencan Political 
Science Review, Vol. 86, No_ 1 (March 1992), pp_ 24-36; Christopher l.ayne, "Kant or 
Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace" in International Securitv, Vol. 19, NO. 2 (Fall 
1992), pp_ 5-49; and Mark Peceny, "The Inter-American System as a Liberal 'Pacific 
Union'?" in Latin American Research ReVIew, Vol. 29, No.3 (1994). pp. 188-20 1 
'
J4Jorge Castaneda, '"finally, the Hemisphere Sees a Just U. S. Intervention: Haiti," 
Los Angeles Times, October 26,1994, p. 235 
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Cenainly Ari stide was ~kcted by a broad coalition of supponers (Iavalw) as the Haitian 
President. Howevcr, it was the presence of Amt:rican troops that allowed him to rcclaim his 
democratic right to rule. As In otht:r Latin American courttries, the armed forces have bet:n thc 
single most serious impedimem to the developmt:nt of dt:ffiocracy in Haiti. Due 10 thc success of 
Operation Uphold Democracy, Hai ti t:njoys a kvei of security that it has not \~itm:sst:d for a very 
longtime 
The argument that history shapes th t: future IS evidenced by Haiti's turbulent history The 
roup d'etat agairJSt Arist ide was only the most recent in a long sequence of such interventions, but 
the mere fact that Aristide was democratically elected is proof that the Haitian p<:ople were tired of 
living under dictatorial ruk. Tht:re has been this evidt:nce of democratic progress or what some 
theorists may posit as libcralizationm in Haiti since the popular movement to oust Jean-Claude 
Duvalier in 1986. Haitian civil society--the would-Ix: liberalizers, have not had the power or means 
to !,'1Iarantee a transit ion to democracy. The United States, along ""ith the UK multinational 
coa lition, have played a critical role in helping Haiti transition to democracy. The peaceful 
occupation and strong, consistent support for democracy have allowed Haitians the time needed for 
rebuilding the infrastructure. With the security and stabili ty provided by the multinational force, 
President Aristide has been able to implement his refonns, and start the process of institution-
buildi ng 
I35Described as a ·political opening' by Adam Przeworski, '·The Games of 
Transition," in Scott 11ainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., 
issues ofDemocrntic C'&nsolidation (Notre Dame, TN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1992 ). pp. 105-152 
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Th!;': United States played a maJor role in Haiti's efforts to transition to democracy. Using 
th.: plausible "paths" as described by Stepan, ;>Oexlemally-monitored installation comes the c\os!;':sI. 
Similar to what was seen in Panama and Grenad~ the United Slates and its coalition force used 
intervention, albeit peaceful in Haiti, to overcome the ruling military juntas. As a result of this 
action, Haiti is on(;e again evolving toward a democratic system that has the long-tenn potential of 
consolidation. According to Colc Blasier, the Us. operation in Haiti was more successful than 
those III Panama and Grenada in that it involved neither anned conflict nor loss ofhfe. He points 
out that the removal of a dictator or the holding ofa free ele(;tion does not signal the achievement 
of democracy, rather. such actions are only first steps. ]J1 U.S. assistance and support for democmcy 
enabled Haiti to make s ignificant advances in nurturing the dcmocmtic process and building 
sustainable institut ions. Moreover, since the U.S.-led intervention, one year ago, human rights 
conditions have improved drastically 
D. SUMMARY 
The analysis in this chapter supports the assertion that U.S. support is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for democmtization in Haiti. While U.S. assistance is vital, the United States 
cannot expon democmcy without Haiti's participation. By and large, Haiti must democmtize "from 
within." Without the suppon and assistance of the United States, Haiti would still be struggling 
under military dictatorship. For three years, there were ongoing efforts to restore Aristide, including 
,J6Stepan, "Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative 
Considemtions," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schminer, and Laurence 
Whitehead, cds .• Tmnsjtiotls from AUlhorjtanan Rule" Comparative PersQCctives, pp 64-
84 
; J7Blasier, "Dilemmas in Promoting Democracy: Lessons from Grenada, Panama, 
and Haiti," North-South Issues: Dcm()(;racv, VoL IV, NoA , 1994, p. 6 
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sanctions, none ofwhi(;h succeeded in ousting the military and rcstoring Aristide. Seemingly, the 
mi litary j untas only ceded power when they real ized that President Clinton had actually ordered an 
Invasion, proving that hI>: had no qualms in carrying it out u.s. intervention and continued support 
for democracy have provided Hait i with the time it needs as it begins to rebuild and refortn key 
institutions. and gain (;ivilian control over the military 
Given the dl>:parture of U.S. troops on l\{arch 31, 1995, the parliamentary dections held on 
June 25,1995 with run·offelections held on September 17, 1995, this thesis argues that a like ly 
scenario is one of democratic transition and eventual consolidation in Haiti, despite its turbulent 
history. Although a great deal remains to be done in Haiti, having achieved the key objc(;tive, the 
MNF reports a successful operation to date. The assistance provided by the tvfNf resulted in the 
"ejection ofthl>: military coup leadl>:rs, and the restoration of the legitimate govemml>:nt of Hatti, and 
the establishment of a securc and stable I>:nvironment that will allow for the transition to UNI\t1IH. " us 
With this tYPI>: of support, the Hattians can now make grcat strides in the effort to rebuild vital 
institutions (political, mil itary, social, and economic) 
Since the V.S .-led intervention, Hatti has enJoycd a number of positive (;hanges and 
improved conditions. Enoouraging cvidence includes: a decrease in reporll>:d human rights abuses; 
less Haitians attempting to nee their country; overhaul of the judicial s)-stem; detentions and arrests 
that are now only carricd out with a warrant, except in cases where offenders are caught in the act 
of committing flagrant offenses; nl>:w measures to assure respect for thc fu ndamental rights of 
prisoners and to improve prison conditions; and the creation of the National Commission lor Truth 
L3,U S, President, "Rcport to Congress on the Situation in Ham,' Fcbruary I, 
1995, The White Housc, Offi(;e of the Press Seaetary, p. 9 
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and Justice, the mandate of which consists of publicizing the truth about violations and crimes 
committed during the military dictatorship and assigning responsihility for them In addition, 
Aristide's efforts toward a more accountable and effective state include taxing the wealthy as well 
as the pooL Amid grave failures in collecting taxes as required by i1aitian law, the General Director 
of the National Tax Administration was replaced by Clefeme Prevert. Aristidc noted that 
"economic reconciliation begins in this institution While in most societies taxation is used to 
gather revenues for social and other national needs, in ilaiti taxation has historically been used to 
transfer wealth from the poor to the wealthy- the wealthy and large businesses traditionally have 
paid no taxes, whi le the poor have been heavily taxed." U9 Creating a functional system of taxation 
is one of the fundamental challenges of democratization 
As reported hy !vfjehael S. Serrill, "the press is free, political parties arc vigorous and human 
rights abuses are at a historic low." 140 Moreover, with the support of foreign advisers, Aristide h~ 
taken steps to make a broken and bankrupt nation viable again. The Haitian economy is growing 
at a healthy pace of4.5 percent a year. The inflation rate stands at 25 percent less than half the level 
in September 1994. Some factories and other businesses have also reopened. I" Despite its 
successes in the one year since U.s. intervention, Haiti faces major challenges in the quest for 
democracy. Uppennost in the minds of many, is that the immensely popular Aristide must step 
down after his replacement is elected in December elections. According to Douglas Farah, the only 
person who now seems deternlined to sec Aristidc leave on schedule is Aristide himself. Even 
'-'''Haiti Update from internet: Haiti Home page, September 13, 1995 
:.oSerrill, "Haiti Rising from Ruin," fu~, October 16,1995, p. 87. 
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though Arisllde is constitutionally ban-cd from sceking a second tenn III the next election, there is 
a grO\\1ng clamor for him to stay. It IS no longer just the masses. Leading families of the elite. who 
long viewed Aristide v.ith distrust, now VlCW him as a stabIlizing force. According to US, National 
Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, Aristide advisers, and Aristide himself, Aristidt: plans to step down 
as plcdged.142 The primary fear is the idcntity of Aristide's successor, and that the ncw president 
will rule without international supervision. On the heels of the presidential election, the U1\i\1TH 
with its 7,000 troop contingent is schcduJed to pull out in February 1996. The newly-tramed Haitian 
police fo rce must take over thc prescrvation of law and order in a Haitian socicty that remains 
plagued by discontent and political violence, Moreover, the process of privatizing Haiti's inefficient 
and money-losing state-owned companies continues to challenge Aristide, and will challcnge hi s 
successor as wcll 
P1Farah, "Aristidc Wllline to Quit, but Many Want Him to Stay,' 1M 
Washington Post, October I, 1995. Sect A32 
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V. U.S. POLlCY L\lrUCATIONS AN)) RECOMMEN D;\. nONS 
There is substantial debate on the role and effectiveness of external actors versus internal 
actors in the promotion and protection of democracy With the end of the Cold War, the United 
States has become increasingly supportive of democratic movements and institutions throughout 
the world. Generally considered Ihe most imroITant external actor in Latin Amcrica, the United 
States has proved itself a significant actor in Haitian affairs. However, as noted by Lowenthal, 
the impact of U.S . policy on Latin American democracy was usually negligible, and only 
occasionally positive \4) What does U. S. policy toward Haiti imply for future U. S. foreign 
policy- more specifically, US foreign policy in tenns of fledgling democracies requiring U.S 
assistance/support? Should intervention be limikd to Latin America or should o ther regions of 
the world be included? 
The first step in assessing U.S policy toward Haiti is to analyZe the causes, scope, and 
significance of changes in the region There have been unquestionable changes taking place in 
Latin America during the past few years: an emerging consensus among eC<Jnomie policy makers 
on the main tenets of sound policy; the even more universal embrace of constitutional 
democracy as an Ideal; and a growing disposition toward pragmatic coopcmtion with the United 
States. Thomas Carothers argues that external actors, even powerful ones like the United States, 
are limited in thei r ability to affect a country's political process. , ... Hc gives more credit to the 
weight of history, culture, and the independent actions of indigenous fo rces 
J4!Lowenthal, p. 243 
14"Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin Americ~ 
Reaoan Years (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 19(1), p. 261 
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Promoting democracy worldwide, protecting national security interests, and expanding 
trade are the three pillars of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy. The Clinton 
Administration's foreign policy agenda seeks to promote democracy, as seen in the estahlishment 
ofa U.S. government inter-Agency Working Group on Democracy and Hwnan Rights; proposal 
of Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act; and the promotion of democracy in countries as 
diverse as Haiti and South Africa. Despite such eftons, a hemispheric political community, in 
favor of democracy, is far from achieved. Lowenthal noted that agreement in principle within 
the OAS on collective measures to protect democra(.,"y, although a notable achievement, has been 
difficult to put into practice in Haiti and Peru amid disagreement about whether, how, and for 
how long to impose sanctions.14) 
In much of Latin America, there is continuing wariness about possible U.S 
intervention-now no longer justified by anti-communism but motivated instead by human rights, 
democracy, drugs, environmental degradation, or the proliferation of deadly weapons. The 
irony is that without external assistance from key players like the United States, democracy in 
countries like Haiti would not be possible. For three years Haiti struggled to rid itself of its 
militruy rulers but to no avail. It was only v.ith the reality or the U.S.-led military intervention 
that Haitian Anny Commander in Chief, General Raoul Cedras agreed to step down 
The U.S.-led military intervention has led to a less turbulent, more secure and stable 
environment in Haiti. However, much of the endemic violence and terror remain. The key to 
continued success of the UNtvUH win be in the a",sistance provided to Haiti in training a civilian 
14'LowenlhaJ, "Latin America: Ready for Partnership?" FQ~~, Winter 1993, p 
74 
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police force, and III strengthening fledgling political institutions Inasmuch as there is no real 
U S. security threat or economic interest in Haiti, the goal of the U. S.-led intcr.:ention is a 
democratic to nn of government. To attain such a goal , it is necessary to assist Haiti in 
rebuilding and development. Foreign aid is especially crucial in light of the devastation v,Tought 
by three years of sanctions. According to the Clinton Administration, suppon for democracy 
serves U S, ideals and US. intercsts. A more democratic world is a world that is more peaceful 
and more stable, Thus, an American foreign policy of engagement for dcmocracy must 
effectively address 
(I) ~ng Democ~: Help to lead an international effon 10 assist the emerging, and 
still fragile, democracics in Eastern Europe and thc fonner Soviet Union build democratic 
institutions in free market settings, deill liitanze their socicties and integrate their economies imo 
the world trading system In the post-Cold War era, US. foreign assistance programs in Africa, 
the Caribbean, Latin America and elsewhere should be targeted at helping democracies rather 
than tyrants 
(2) Democracy Coms: Promote democratic institutions by creating a Democracy Corps to 
send American volunK-ers to countries that seek legal, financial, and political expenise to 
build democratic institutions, and suppon groups like the National Endowment for Democracy, 
the Asia foundation, and others 
PreSident Clinton, the first US. president to visit Haiti since Franklin Roosevelt in 1934, 
witnessed the March 31, 1995 turnovcr of the U.S.-led operation to a United Nations mission 
The UNMlH Includes troops from many nations and is to remam in Haiti Wltil the February 1996 




United States 2,400 engineering, aviation, logistics, specia l torccs, light cavalry 
Pakistan - 850 troops 
Bangladesh - 850 troops 
Canada - 475 engineering, aviation, logistics 
~'epal - 410 troops 
Carihhean Community (CARlCOM) 300 troops 
Netherlands - 142 troops 
Honduras - 120 troops 
Guatemala- 120 military police 
India - 120 troops 
Surinamc - 36 troops 
Argentina - 27 troops 
Headquarters Sta1T: 172 (all countries) 
CIVILIAN POLICE: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Canada, 
Djibouti, Dominica, France, Grenada, Guinea, Bissau, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Russia, Senegal, S1. Vincent and the Grenadines, SL Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, 
Suriname, and Togo. 1<6 
Haiti ' s proximity to the United States played a major role in the level of U.S 
involvement. Traditionally, there has not been much U.S. intervention in troubled countries that 
are a long distance away from the United States. For instance, it is not likely that the United 
States will intervene, militarily, in Rwanda or other African and Asian nations, despite the 
atrocities in those countries. There were approximately 500,000 to 1,000,000 Rwandans killed 
in just a few months of hi at ant genocide, compared v.ith up to 3,000 Haitians killed during the 
'""'Reuter, 'America On-Line," March 29,1995, p. I 
three years of Haitian military rule. 147 Although the United States is generally coosidered the 
sale remaining superpower, it docs not have sufficIent resources to respond fully to all 
worldwide crises The U.S. focus is thus centered on troubled coull\ries in close geographic 
proximity to the United Slates. The question often arises: Just what are the nat ional interests of 
tbe United Slates, regarding its ~outhern neighbors') Lowenthal points out that Latin America is 
significant for the United States in at least four areas 
( I ) EeonoIl1i!t.: The region has become the fastest growing market for US exports Latin 
America bought more than $65 billion of U.S. exports in 1992, more than Japan or Gcrmany, 
and the rate of increase in V.S. exports to Latin America for the years 1991 and 1992 bas been 
three times as great as that for all other regions. Latin America also remains the source of nearly 
30 percent of V.S. petroleum imports, anu several U.S. money center banks still make a 
significant share of their income in the region 
(2) Latin America's cffect oll1!l!L0lJlrobJems faCing American societv : The most 
dramatic example is narcotics. Site of the world's largest rain forests and as leading destroyers 
of them during the past few years, Latin American countries are also central actors on 
environmental issues 
(3) A mime arena (tQg(:~~(QIlli§"~IlQJbe countries ~.~ 
and central Europe) f~re US values of~tic governance and free mar~ 
economies: As both democracy and capitalism are severely challenged in Ihe fonner communist 
countries, the worldwide appeal and credihility of these ideas may depend, imponantly, on 
whether our nearest neighbors can make them work 
"'Fauriol, pp. 10-11 
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(4) Emigration: Perhaps the most important, the burgeoning Latin American pressures for 
emigration, create additional links between the emigrants' countries and the United Statcs, and 
enlarge the U.S. stake in the rq,rlon's social, economic, and political conditions. Almost half of 
all legal immigrants to the United States came from Latin America and the Caribhean during the 
1 980s, togdher ",ith more than half of the undOClilllt:nted entrants. Some ten percent of the U.S 
population today are Latin American immigrants or their descendants Latinos are the fastest 
gro\\ing population group in the United States.14S 
In addition, Lowenthal argues that the chance for positive U.S. policies to reinforce Latin 
American progress and thereby advance U.S. aims depend on revitalizing the U.S. economy 
Ibe United States cannot successfully implement the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) or help build a wider hcmisphcric economic und democratic community ifit dOt:s not 
at the same time rejuvenate its own decaying infrastructure, upgrade its technology, enhance the 
skills of its workforce, retrain displaced workers, and assist uncompetitive industries and their 
communities adjust to change. Throughout the western hemisphere, people are concerned about 
making democracy work - by cOllilecting institutions to people and ensuring accountability 
The intervention in Haiti sends a clear message to would· be coup leaders (military or 
otherwise). It demonstrates that the United States, along with the majority ofthc hemisphere 
and the world, stand ready to protect democracy (i .e multilateral ism with a common political 
objective) 
For those who playa pivotal role in fonnulating the broad goals of U.S . policy, like the 
National Security Council (NSC), led by Anthony Lake, the State Department under WaITen 
'4ILowenthal, p. 74 
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Christopher, and Pn:sident Clinton, it is important to have a strong, decisive foreign policy 
agenda. The challenglo: for such extemal actors is to support and assist a country' s 
democratization efiorts- establishing civilian control of the military, and building democratic 
institutions that endure, are honest, responsive, and legitimate To that end, some 
recommendations are 
(a) Continue with events like the December 1994 , Summit of the Americas 
At the Summit of the Americas, the leaders endorsed eight initiatives that 
strengthen legislative, judicial, and law enforcement bodies that protect citizens 
and uphold democracy. The strengthened democratic institutions will bolster 
the abilitv of the OAS to foster dialogue, support legislation and electoral refoml, 
and impr~ve the administration of justice. To combat corruption, an em:my of 
democratic governance, the summit leaders ab'Tced to forge links between the 
OAS and the OECD in the fight against commercial bribery and to try to ensure 
better tics between law enforcement authoritics. The leaders endorsed Venezuela's 
proposal for a hemispheric agreement to extradite and prosecute those engaged in 
COmlpt practices 
(b) Encourage and allow not onl y Chile, but other countries to join NAFTA 
(c) Promote and protect democracy - peacefully and multilatcrally - as attempting in Haiti 
Cd) Assist \vi th multilateral efforts to help train and refonn Latin American militaries 
(e) Lift the Cuban cmbargo - why punish innocent people simply to punish Castro'l 
(f) Assist the Haitians in civi l-military relations, particularly when it comes to gaining civilian 
control over the military. Continue assisting in the training of a viable civilian police force 
(g) Help in strengthening the poli tical process, including the creation of such crucial factors as a 
viable political party systlo:m, an effective legislative branch, and a credible criminal justice 
system. These institutions nced to be strengthcned, improving their efTectiveness, oversight, 
law-making, and responsiveness to citizen wncerns 
(h) Support the electoral process, prior, during, and after the elections. 
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( i) Assist companies that were forced to close by the embargo of Haiti, encourage the rdum of 
foreign companies, and attract new companies to Haiti 
(i ) Ensure the USAlD Recovery Plan for Haiti is followed through, including the plans for 
rebuilding, recovery, and sustainable development: 
USAID SHORT TERM OBJECTIVl:S "'Rl:BUILDING" 
Create a civilian Interim Public Security Force (lPSf) 
Demobilize and reintegrate anned forces 
Make court and penal systems operational 
Carry out elections 
Create cmplo)ment 
Clear arrears 
Provide balance of payments support 
Support Government of Haiti democrati7.ation of public assets efforts 
Continue humanitarian assi~1:ance 
lTSAlD:\-lID TERM ORJECfIVES "'RECOVERY" 
Rebuild system of justice 
Establish a permanent civilian police force 
Strengthen local governance 
Provide assistance in agriculture, envirorunent, education, and micro-enterprise 
Strengthen government of Haiti tinancial and technical institutions 
Support presidential elections 
USAID LOKG TERM OS.TECTJVE "SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPi\IENT'" 
Strengthen public sector institutions 
Promote social reconciliation 
Protect thc environment l49 
Tn addition, Robert Pastor presented seven proposals to facilitate the transition from 
dictatorship and the consolidation of democracy (many of which have come to pass) 
'49Fauriol, pp_ 183-184 
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PASTOR'S 1989 PROPOSALS 
(1) NATION.t\.! . COMMJTTEES 1.0 DEFEND DEMO(:MCY organizations to suppon the 
democratic process, much as human rights organi zations defend individual rights 
(2) TRANSNATIONAL BO~I!\1;ORCE PLURALISM: A vigorous democracy needs 
independent organizations that reflect the interests and concerns ofhusincss, labor, the press, 
consumers, universities, churches, and the full range of specific inten::sts in a country. 
(3) A..""I fNTERNATTONAL ELECTION MONITORING ORGAN1Z~. For democracies to 
be secure, elections need to be free and fair. \V!Jen questions arc raised about the fairness of 
elections, legitimacy and power diminishes and the government that takes office is flawed. 
(4) GOVERNMENT POLICIES: A NE\V BEIANC.Ql.!E.LDOCTR-.lliJ;;: For international 
organizations to be established and effectivc, changes are necessary in each government' s 
policies. All democracies routinely and rhetorically dcfend democracy, but few ifany have 
specific policies for implementing that defense 
(5) W H TILATERALIZJl:Ki...'II1E.DTIAN.C ... mflU.l..)()CTRlliE (Dcmocracy in the Inter-
American systcm): This is similar to the December 1994 Summit of the Americas, where 34 of 
the 35 hemispheric country leaders met, to among other things, assess thc state of democracy III 
the region and develop recommendations on ways to strengthen democracy where it exists and 
promote democracy where it is absent 
(6) QRQIW OF DEMOCRATIC PRFS..ID.ENIS: Since the reSlUgencc of democracies in the 
region, inaugurations of new presidents in the Americas have become occasions for presidents of 
Latin America to meet and discuss a range of contemporary issues 
(7) A COUNCIJ" OF DEMOCRATIC HEAPS OF GOVER.J"\JMENT: Establishment ofa council 
to enSUIe that the democratic openings of the 1980s not be lost. Provides assistance whem:vcr a 
president detemlines tbat democracy in his country is threatened. 
!N SU;v[MARY, tbere is mucb tbat can he done by outside groups, institutions, and individuals 
to reinforce those democrats in the Amcncas who are dctennined to prevent the pendulum of 
democracy from s,,"inging back toward dictatorship. 110 
Pastor also added that "'the United States should begin to fOCus its foreign policies on 
Latin American issues. The end of the Cold War, changes in Latin America, and the doy,lltum 
in the U. S. eC{lnomy arc contributing to the need to change focus . Free tradc bet".-een Latin 
! ~obert Pastor, ed. , Q~)' .. .iruh.c.Aru~jng tb<e...P~1!!l (New York 
Holmes & Mcier Publishers, Tnc. , 1989), pp 144-153 
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Amcrica and the United States \\>111 allow the United States to compete morc ctTectively 
intemationally."' ~ l 
There are those who argue that democracy is not possible in Haiti For instance, Ian 
Vasquez points out that U.S. cfforts to stn:ngthcn democracy in Latin America by working 
through thc OAS have not bcen successful and have often caused damage. US policy should 
focus on free trade rather than crusading missions for democracy.' " According to Suzanne 
Gardinier, U.S. foreign policy is dominated by a small elite, whose policy options are not 
infonned by a democratic consensus of the American people. Furthennore, Gardinier writes that 
in this country [United States], a bewildered and vigorous debate is 
taking place over the direction "our" foreign poli(,'Y should take, 
now that the comforting dualism of the Cold War has disappeared 
The Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, and the 
Ambassador to the United Nations, and the Secreta!)' of Defense 
and the Chairman oflhe Joint Chiefs ofStaft~ all elected by no one, 
confront unprecedented geopolitical dilemmas like those rooted in 
Haiti and Somalia and the fonner Yugoslavia v.ilh words like 
"enlargement," "muscular multilateralism," and "dual containmelll," 
backed, as is our custom, by the threat of massive military force.] ;' 
Strengthening democracy means first and foremost, bolstering the public and private 
institutions that defend human rights, engage citizens in the political process, and promote 
justice. For democracy to succeed and thrive, govemments must be ahle to respond to citizens' 
needs effectively, regularly, and fairly. Gardinier also made note of the MarclvApril 1994 
fQrtign Affairs issue, where U.s National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, summonc<l the new 
llipastor, "Thc Latin American Option," Foreign Policy (Fall 1992), p. 107 
I5l Vasqucz, "Washington's Dubious Crusadc for Hemisphcric Democracy," USA Today 
Magazine (January 1995), p. 54 
1l3Gardinier, "In Sean;h of Democracy," The Progress~ (September 1994), p. 16 
but somehow familiar specter of what he called "backlash states" (Cuba, ]'.;"orth Korea, Iran, Iraq, 
and Libya) whI ch threaten <'the family of nations now committed to the pursuit of democratic 
institutions, the expansion of free markets, the peace ful settlement of conflict, and the promotJon 
of collective security - thus, [USj policy must face the reali ty of recalcitrant and outlaw states 
that not only choose to remain outside the fam ily but also assault its hasic va l ues ."l~ 
According to Lowcnthal and Peter Hakim, "Internal problems have made it dIfficult for 
newly-democrat ic countries in Latin America to effect true dcmocracy. Thus, Latin America 
needs combined assistance from the United States and its allies"'" The world is seemingly at 
another pivotal point in history. The collapse of communism docs not mean the end of danger or 
threats to U.S. interests. However, it does pose an unprecedented opportunity to make the future 
more secure and prosperous. Once again, a compell ing vision for globallcadership at the dawn 
of a new era must be defined . The United States must be prepared to usc military force 
decisively when necessary to defend its vi tal interests. The burdens of collective security in a 
new era must be shared fai rly, and multilateral peacekeeping, through the United Nations and 
other international efforts, should be encouraged. The single most important r(.'Commendation is 
that US. foreign policy continue to fu lly support democratization and market reform throughout 
the world 
1.l'Lowcnthai and Hakim, 'Democracy on Trial : Poli tics in Latin America," ~ (February 
1992), p. 28 
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V1. CONCL lISIO,'\' 
There are three possible conclusIOns that can be reached in this thesis, concerning the 
potential impact of the Umted States on the transition to democracy in Haiti: (a) U. S, support is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for democmti7ation in Haiti, (b) U, S. support is necessary but not 
sufficient, and (c) U.S. support is not necessary or sufficient The thesis supports the second 
explanation, concluding that the United States' support of democracy in Haiti is a nccessary but 
insuffi cient condition for establishing democracy in that country. The United Slates cannot 
compensate for Haiti's internal shortcomings, but it can seek to affect the two most important 
internal factors for Haiti ' s democratization civil-military relations and political institutions. U S. 
support fordcmocrncy in Haiti wi ll only succeed if the Haitian civilian government exercises control 
over the military, and if Haiti 's political institutions are efficient and functioning properly. 
A, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In Hai ti there have been past efforts to pursue democracy as a form of government 
However, these democratization efforts have been unsuccessful, primarily due to the Haitian 
military's recurring role in politics The ruling military junta, which had assumed power after the 
1991 military coup, was finally ousted as a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts and the U.S.-led 
intervention in September 1994. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was returned, and democracy in 
Haiti is seemingly in transition. 
The U S.-led intcrvcntion and support provides the environment and opportunity for Haitians 
to lay foundations for democratization. The Haitian govenunent, I'lith the support of its ci tizens, 
must develop and maintain control over the military, and establish viable political institutions 
Bui lding institutions from the ground up will lIot be an easy lask However, with international 
9\ 
assi~1ancc, Haiti has made encouraging strides in its democratizat ion efforts. For instance, despite 
allegations of irregularities, the internationally monitored elections held in June and Septembl>:r 
1995, constitute a positive step in Haiti 's effort to transition to democracy 
Democratization, in its hroadest sense, invol\'I>:S the creation of institutions of civil and 
political society . The institutions of civil society arl>: consl>:nsus-building mechanisms that allow 
people to participate in governmental decisions that affect their lives and hold in check the forces 
of tyranny, Democratization does not mean that every government in the world must emulate the 
U. S. experience ~ that is a narrow deflnition of democracy. However, it is essential for institution-
building to occur in a manner that guarantecs all people greater access to, and participation in, thc 
political, I>:conomic, and social life of their nation 
The heliefthat the military has the right and the duty to change the government in order to 
protect their existence, achieve their goals, and protect and/or modernize thl>: state has dominated 
the thinking of many Latin American military officers for dccadl>:s, Latin American soldiers have 
traditionally bcen significant political actors, especially in Haiti Thus, civilian control of thl>: 
military is a requisite of any stable democrat-,' 
President Aristide 's 1991 attempt to control the mi litary failed, but due to the opportunity 
provided by the 1994!i995 international coalition, Aristide has abolished the Haitian military. On 
the anniversary of Aristide's October 15, 1994 return to Haiti, that country is farther aJong in growth 
and democratic development than thought possihle when Aristidc resumed the presidency in 1994 
Although a great deal remains to be done in Haiti, having achieved the key objective, the 
Multi-National Force (MN'F) reports a successful operation to datl>:_ The assistance provided by the 
MNF resulted in the departure of the military coup leaders, the restorat ion of Haiti's legitimate 
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govemment, and the estahlishmem of a secure and stable environment. With this type of support. 
and favorable conditions, the Haitians can now make greater stndes III the efforllo rebuild vila l 
institutions such as the poJitical party system, the legislature, and the Judiciary, As reponed to the 
Congress, 
The Government of Haiti has been restored. With passage ofessentialla'l'.'S , 
and the recent establishment of a Provisional Electoral CounciL the Haitian 
people contmuc to take on more responsibility for their nation's future and are 
appreciative orthe efforts orthe international community on their behalf. IJ 6 
Can the futurc fonn of government in Hait i be predicted? This thesis argues, optimistically, 
for the prospects of Haitian democracy hased on the analysis and rcsearch completed through 
September 1995. I\s long as the Haitian people: (a) are empowered by U S. support and ass!stance, 
(b) gain control over the Haitian military, and (c) succeed in revamping political institutions, then 
a sll~tamable ttamition to democracy is possihle. The overwhelming success of Operation Uphold 
Democracy, along with a seemingly genuine desire of the Republ ic of Haiti to democratize, leads 
to the conclusion that Haiti could be on the long road to democratic consolidation, In addition, 
international pressure and the lack of credible alternatives to democracy contribute to the future 
prospects of democracy in Haiti 
Democracy building is inherently a long-term process The cnd results of thc U.S,-led 
intervention in Haiti will not be completely discernible for somc time yet Although the political 
environment is stabl e, democratization in Haiti is not yet a facL Instead, the more reasonable 
conclusion is tha t Haiti is In a transition of sons, and time will reveal the future of this nation 
,)6U.S. President, "Report to Congress on Ine Situation in Haiti ,' February I, 
1995, The \Vhite House Office oflhe Press Secretary, pp. 9, 10 
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There are many hurdles that Haiti must still confront. The next six months, with the December 
pn:sidl:ntial election, is very important to the future democratic development of the countl)'. The 
fact that thc international community is committed to giving Haiti a window of opponunity, to 
nurture democracy, lends crcdencc to the idea of a democratic Haiti 
ll. TilE HAITlAN CASE: CAN IT BE GENERALIZED'! 
Based on thc analysis, can one generalize from the Haitian case? The Haitian case can 
perhaps be generalized, especially for countries with a similar history of non-democmtic rule, 
authoritarianism, and military domination. For instance, in tenns ofthe need for U.S assistance and 
suppon of democratic development, post-Castro Cuba might benefit from the Haitian case 
Moreover, the Haitian case may have implications for states in other regions such as the newly 
independent Russian states and various African stales. 
Although most Latin Americans favor democracy as a fonn of government, the simple truth 
is that representative democracy is not being successfully consolidated in some of Latin America 
Instead, what is often being entrenched is what has been caUed "dl:mocracy by default," "de1egative 
democracy," or "low-intensity democracy,,, lj, Governments that derive their initial mandate from 
popular election are tempted to govern "above" parties, legislaturcs, eouns, intercst groups, or the 
orgarU7,ations of civil society To the extent that they do, \-\'eak institutions are further undennincd, 
accountability is Ihv.-aned, public cynicism and apathy grow, and legitimacy is eroded. This 
syndrome poses thc dangcr, in several countries, ofa slide toward renewed authoritarian rule. albeit 
;)'Lowentha!. " Latin America: Ready for Partnership" ~D- Affaiu (Winter 
1993), p. 74 
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different from the anti-Communist military regimes ofthe 1970s lSa Many authors argue that the 
weakness of democracy in Latin America is the result of a strong authoritarian heritage that has 
made the process of establishing an alternative political system difficult. ] l9 
In addition, what of those Latin American countries where democracy may be vulnerable? 
There is some question as to the survivability of some third wave democracies, particularly those 
where democracy is relatively new, such as in Panama, Grenada, NIcaragua, and £1 Salvador. These 
countries lack the tradition of a democmllc form of government. If these countries experience 
challenges to their democratic form of govcrnment, then the Haitian case can perhaps be useful. 
However, Hait i is unique in its turbulent political history and location, especially in terms of 
proximity to the Unitcd States and its position within the U.S sphere of influence. Traditionally, 
the United States ha~ not intervened, militarily, in the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazi l, 
Chi le) nor in countries like Nigeria or Liberia With this fact in mind, the qucstion of proximity to 
the United States becomes central 
Georges A. Fauriol \vrites that geographic proximity is of the utmost imponance in thc U.S 
response to troubled countries Despite the United Statcs' statuS as thc world's sole remaining 
superpower, it does not havc suffiCIent resources or inclination to respond 10 crises throughout the 
worJd. l6<J Instabil ity in Latin America' s Southern Cone docs not atfect vital U.S. security interests 
L5~ryzanck, U S -Latin American Relations (New York: Pracgcr Publi shers, 
1990), p. 167 
l&JFauriol, ed., Hill1iilll.f.nillr...ill!illLD.il.emmas for U S Polic.J: (Washington DC 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), p. 11 
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For instance, the inunigration problem encountered during the Haitian crisis, would be virtually non-
existent for the United States in Southern Cone crises 
Moreover, of the interviews conducted, none of the interviewees saw thc Haitian case as 
generalizable. They were of the opinion that the Haitian case is unique and that where some aspects 
of the case may be generalizable, the Haitian case is for the most part unique, For instance, Colonel 
Mark D. Boyatt, USMC, is of the opinion that while the Haitian case is not generali:.alble, there are 
some areas like thc rules of engagement, that can be applied to other eowltries. 161 Each country and 
situation is unique, and while the United States can and should intervene, the operation will be 
neccssari ly different. Lieutenant Colonel Allan Thompson, Joint Chiefs of Staff-Western 
Hemisphere, points out the importance of proximity and U.S. sphere ofin11uenee. The mission in 
Haiti is easier to take on and accomplish, especially with Haiti being '"in our backyard." Colonel 
1 'hompson identifies the Haitian model as a "model for interagency cooperation - a benchmark for 
UN coopcration" ,ol Howevcr, overall he notes that the United States must lead the international 
arena on a state by state basis, and that individual countries will neccssarily bc treated differently, 
cspecially landlocked countries like those of Europe. The United States may not take the lead in 
countries that are not in the U.S. spherc of influence. Similarly, Mr. Doron Bard, Haiti Working 
Group, U.s. Department of State, points out that the United Statcs has a spt:{:ial interest in Haiti, and 
that the U_S. action as witnessed in Haiti, will most likely not be scen elsewhere in places like 
Cuba.wI 
'
6 LColonel Boyatt Brief: Special Operations in Haiti, May 4, 1995 
161Lieutenant Colonel Thompson Intcrvicw, Washington DC, May 9,1 995 
lWMr Bard Interview, Washington DC, May 9,1995 
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Dcmocralinltion efforts in Panama are somewhat similar to the scenano in Haiti, in that 
comparable efforts are underway_ USAID programs in Panama has reaped tremendous benefits in 
the five years sincl;.': dl;.':rnocracy was restored_ The Electoral Trihunal, responsible for massivc fraud 
in thc 1988 elections, has becn transfonned into a highly respected public inslitution, canying out 
free and fair elections. The judiciary has worked to make the j ustice system more accessible to 
people through the availability of public defenders. The military has ocen disbanded, and the 
National Police are better trained, under civilian control, and have a btttl;.':r understanding of the role 
ofa poliee force in a democratic society. I .... While in Haiti, migration and human rights abuses have 
decn:ased, the June and Scptcmber 1995 elcctions werc peaceful, free of fraud, and gave voice to 
the political will ofIlaitians_ Aristide chose to disband the military, and the newly trainoo civilian 
police force "'111 assume responsibility for preserving law and order upon the scheduled departure 
of lN1vUH troops in February 1996. 
Haiti's democmtic success rests primarily with the Haitians, and thc ir ability to use to their 
advantage the circumstances created by the U_S_-led intervention_ \Vh.ile the weight of history, 
culture, and the independenl actions of the Haitians has the larger effect, cont inued u.s support and 
assistance is also important for the democratization of Haiti. 
In this hemisphere, the United States has the opportunity to build on accomplishments 
already initiated, and consolidate and enhance them in support of democratic societies and 
democratic institutions_ The SUCCI;.':SS of the mission in Haiti will te~t whether Latin America and the 
Caribbean \-\111 enter the next century with greater freedom for all of its citizens, with expanding 
opportunity, and with new hope_ If the United States docs not continue to take the lead, the 
I;<' USArD, 'Advancing Democracy," Internet, April 1995 
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Americas could enter the new cenTUry plagued by instability, crisis, and failed demoeraeies-
threatening the national interest and security uf the United Stales. 1M On the uther hand, some 
questions for future research include: at what point does US. support for democracy becom!: 
countcrproductive; wbat rationale will be used if itllervention in post-Castro Cuba is dcem!:d 
necessary; moreover, at what point does the United States go from b!:ing perceived as being a part 
of the solution to being a part of the problem" 
'MUSAID Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Internet, l'vtarch 1994 
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ANNEXA: 
DEMOCRACY IN HAITI: A CATlSAL MODEL 
Ludeoendent Varill.bles Depeodeot Variable 
INTERSAL: [ XTERJ,"AL: 
! U.s. SUPPORT! 
I DEMOCRACY I 




Three Guesses: Who is Aristidc'! 
ii;mll/I) 's 
HERO 
Among his SUppor1I!fS , who still constitute the great mass of Haitians, the name 01'11;311-
Bertrand Aristide evokes something close 10 UWI.:- U breath-slopping look of hop;: and exa ltation 
that is humbling in its sin<.;eril)' and naked emotion. 
Frolll on in(erview by /?oher/ W. Shaman Ifl the 
liberal newsmllga::lI1e "('(//lIhlO 1(j" olA1UilriJ 
TERRORIST 
On failure 10 curb the VIOlence An stide: "we will avoid such c~cesses; we will seek 
understanding" Robert Sherman "As they did in January 199 1, when your supporters burned 
hundreds of your political rivals ali ve, without your raisi ng a tinger to stop them?: Aristidc: "The 
military' s propaganda has magnilicd events Ihal were never more than small incidents that gOI 
out of control, Unfortunately, violence begets violence, and we were nol the ones who started it 
I would like to say that we have learned our lesson, that we have paid a hIgh price for the 
mistakes we may have committe<! because of our lack ofexpt!rience " 
From un eli/torUli ill 111", //herui "/'u J ornllJu" o! 
SELLOUT 
During hi s long stay in the Unt Ied Stales, AriSlide lost the political image that carried him to 
pow~r. _ whil~ his plan then [1991J aimed at depriving the armt:d force s orlhe privileges they 
had taken ovcr the years by fire and blood, Aristide now wants an improbable reconcil iat ion 
between the exc:cutioners and their victims 












THE TEN COMMANDMENTS Of DEMOCRACY IfII' HAITI 
BY ARJSTJUI<:, SEPTEMBER 25, 1991 
Liberty or death 
Democracy or death 
Fiuelity to human rights 
The right to eat and to work 
The right to demand what rightfully belongs to us 
1.egitimate defense of the diaspora, or tenth department. 
No to violence, yes to Lava/as 
Fidelity to the human being, the highest form of wealth 
Fidelity to our culture. 
Everyone around the same table 




ANNEX D: MA lOR HAITIAN EVENT S 
HAITI'S TlIRBlILENT PAST: ''1I\ . 'OR_F._V>_:''_''~'S ______ ~ 
SL.-Wf; Rn'OL.UTlo/"!, 
1- --------+----------- ------- - -----------------
JANIJAR Y 1 R04 UAITII>[C L.AR[ S ITS 1_'il>[P[~DENCE 
j! INE 181 6 ptTiON DECLARED FIR.'n "PR ESIDENT fOR LIFE" 
1811-11-14'1 IIAITIINVADES SANTO DO'\'IINGO. IINlTESJRLLES ENTIRE ISLANO 
JUNE 1838 fRANC.: RF.COGNIZH> AN INDEPENUI<:NT !lAITI 
JUNE 1861 UNITED STATES RECOGNIZE!) AN lNDEPENDENT HAITI 
AUG11ST 1912 NATIONAL PALAC E BLOW N UP-I'RESID ENT LECONTJ.o: et.:II. KILLEn 
~. _____ I~II~A~'T~'~H~A~S-7 ~PR~E~S~ID~E~N~TS~I~N~7~Y~E~A~R~~-~O~N ~T~IIE~"R~'~'~K~O~F~C~'V~I~L~~IA~R~ 
JULY 1915 PRESIDENT SAM KILLED BY STRfET MOB 
JULY 1915 II.S. MARIN":S ''''VAIll': TO RF.STORE O nm:R, PIWTECT INTERt:STS 
AUGUST 1934 .. :NIl OF AMt:IlICA:'II OCCl rp,\TION 
SEPTEMBER IQ57 nlANCOIS " )·.'\I' ,", DOC" nUVALmR n.ECTEJ) I'RESIDEN'I 
- -
AI)R IL 19M 1'.o\P,", DOC DECLARES IIIMSF.t F "I'RI':SID":NT fOR LIFE" 
APRtL 1971 _ _ -+",,'E=--A=-N,,'-C::'L=-A,,-II~D=-E ."~I=-'A=-"-,Y.::DO=C_" =-DU=-V=-A" L",' E::' R=-"::'=:Ccc'O=-M.::'.=-S~PR=-':::S~ID::E=-' N=-'T _ _ -+ 
FEF3RIJARY 1986 UARY ()()C E:XILEO TO Ji RANC~ AMH>ST POI'IILAR tll'RISINGS 
.!::ARC[[ 1987 






SEPTEM BER 1991 
~EI99J 
~£EMnER 1993 
VOTERS APPROVE NEW CONSTI'=-rt,,;,'=-IO=-N-'---______ _ _ 
VOTER-MASSACRE, EL[CnON CALU;O-OFt' 
COilP d'ETAT m ;rOSED i\-HNIGAT,INSTALLED GEi'iERAL NAMI'HY 
COlJPd'ETAT DHOSED NAMPHY, Il'\STALLED GENERA L AVRIL 
·\VRH,STEI'>S OOWN AMIO ANTI-GOVERNM ENT OEMONSTRATIONS 
P,\SCAL-TROIIII ,LOT-PIU:SIDF.NT O F CIVILIAN PROVISIONAl , (~OVT, 
.' IRST O£1\U>CRATIC ELECTIOI'\j - ARISrlDE WINS 
COUP d'KIAT - A1USTIDF. m:pos .. :n, .~XIU: D TO IINITED STATES 
UN II\1POSED WORI ,DWln l OIL EMBARGO, -FROzr: ASSlnS ABROAD 





I:un I'S Tl'RBULEYI' I'AS \' : \ Lo\JOH. EVFN'IS 
( '.S. DIPLOMATIC DEL£G.\TlON AVERTS li.S.I::.N::'...:AS::.:·'.::O:...N _______ _ 
SEPTEMFH::R 1t.J94 OPERATION lll'II0LO DEMOCRACY. US- l iN CG.\L11'10N OF FORC":S 
O ... :TOBER 199-1 ARISl"Jl)[ RESTORED AS '-UITIA N PRESIDE~T 
JANUAR Y 1995 UN DECLARt<:S .\ SECURE AND 51'.-\81 ,[ ENVlltOI\MENT IN HAITI 
~~ .. ~"~'C~H~I~99~5 ____ ~"S~·T~R~A~N=S~F"~· R~(~)P=E=R=A=T'=O=N.c'=·O='=JN::M=,=·,=.l=·I N::·A~T"c'.O=N=A"I=. F=O=n::.C"E _ ____ __ 
JUNE 1<,195 P.-\RUAMENTARY ELECTIONS UELI) 
SHTEMRrR 1995 RtIN-OH' Jo:I.F.CTIONS IIElD 
DEC[,\IR ER 1995 I'RESIDENTlAI.. ELECTIONS SCII)::D(!I.f.D ~-~ Ann c:-;: D From Bellegarde-Smllh, The [3rcllched~, Howard French. ilaltl. 33 
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